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LICENSE TO HARASS WOMEN:
REQUIRING HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TO BE "SEVERE OR PERVASIVE" DISCRIMINATES AMONG
"TERMS AND CONDITIONS" OF EMPLOYMENT
JUDITH J. JOHNSON*
INTRODUCTION
Title VII was intended to remedy discrimination; thus, it is ironic
that the courts themselves discriminate among "terms and conditions
of employment" by treating hostile environment discrimination less
favorably, most commonly in sexual harassment cases. As the Su-
preme Court said in its first sexual harassment case, hostile environ-
ment harassment must be "severe or pervasive" to be actionable.1
However, many lower courts have used this language to excuse harass-
ment against women. This Article suggests that the problem
originates in the Court's continued use of the phrase "severe or perva-
sive" to describe actionable conduct. This rather dramatic terminol-
ogy in fact overstates the Supreme Court's later interpretation of the
phrase "severe or pervasive." In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,2 the
Court held that to be actionable the discriminatory conduct had to
"create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an envi-
ronment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive."3
Such conduct falls far short of "severe or pervasive." Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has continued to use the phrase "severe or perva-
sive," and many lower courts have misinterpreted the standard, using
it to bar causes of action by employees who have been subjected to
* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A., University of Texas at
Austin; J.D., University of Mississippi. I would like to thank Elizabeth Jones, Mark Modak-
Truran, Matthew Steffey and Carol West for editorial assistance and Suzanne Collip, Sibyl
Byrd, Della Berry, Olivia Taylor and Heather Aby for editorial and research assistance.
1. Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
2. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
3. Id. at 21. The holding in Harris affirmed a "middle path" between making actiona-
ble any conduct that is "merely offensive" and that which causes a "tangible psychological
injury." Id. The discriminatory conduct must be enough to be subjectively perceived by
the plaintiff, but need not be so great that it leads to physical or psychological impairment.
Id. at 21-22. In other words, the conduct must produce an environment that "would rea-
sonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive." Id. at 22.
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egregious conduct that, in many cases, would be criminal or at least
would outrage any reasonable person.4
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, relig-
ion, color, and national origin in "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment. ''5 Without dispute, harassment that re-
sults in a tangible job action, such as discharge or demotion, alters
terms and conditions of employment.6 This type of harassment is
often called quid pro quo harassment.7 When no tangible employ-
ment action exists, however, the question is whether the harassment
creates a working environment sufficiently hostile or abusive to alter
terms or conditions of employment.' This is referred to as hostile en-
vironment harassment.' Because Title VII does not distinguish
4. See infra Section II (discussing lower courts' interpretations of "severe or
pervasive").
5. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
6. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998).
7. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
8. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54 (finding that where threats to change the terms and
conditions of employment were not acted upon, the harassment claim required a showing
of severe or pervasive conduct under the hostile environment category).
9. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court said that "[t]he terms quid pro quo and hostile work
environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in which
threats are carried out and those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond
this are of limited utility." Id. at 751. Rather than using the familiar quid pro quo and
hostile environment dichotomy for liability purposes, the Court stated:
When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal
to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employ-
ment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment that is actionable under Tide VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the
employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or
pervasive.
Id. at 753-54. The Court defined "tangible employment action" as "a significant change in
employment status." Id. at 761. Thus, other less significant employment actions evidently
must fall under a hostile environment analysis and must be severe or pervasive to be action-
able. See id. at 754. Furthermore, the Court made it clear that threats to carry out tangible
employment actions were to be considered as part of a hostile environment, even though
such cases "based on threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo
cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe
or pervasive to create a hostile work environment." Id. at 751.
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among the various terms and conditions of employment, ° there is no
statutory authority for the courts' distinctive treatment of hostile envi-
ronment harassment cases."1 In no part of Title VII, and for no other
term or condition of employment, is the discriminatory conduct re-
quired to be severe or pervasive to be actionable. 2 Title VII's lan-
guage indicates that the most important issue is "'whether members
of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of em-
ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.' "13 By
requiring that hostile environment harassment be severe or pervasive
before it alters a term or condition of employment and thus violates
Title VII, the courts basically discriminate against one term or condi-
tion of employment by assigning a significantly lower importance to
the right to work in an atmosphere free from discrimination.
This distinctive treatment of hostile environment discrimination
most commonly occurs in sexual harassment cases. In fact, the unfa-
vorable treatment of sexual harassment is most evident when con-
trasted with cases of racial harassment.' 4 Although the Supreme
Court had not decided a case under Title VII based on any type of
Recently the Court has complicated this area even further. In Clark County School Dis-
trict v. Breeden, the Court said that no reasonable person would have believed that the
harassment alleged was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable; therefore, the
plaintiff had no cause of action for alleged retaliation for complaining. 532 U.S. 268, 269-
71 (2001) (per curiam) (ruling that a woman's supervisor and another male co-worker
laughing over a sexually explicit comment found in an applicant's psychological evaluation
did not violate Title VII even when the woman complained and endured subsequent
retaliation).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
11. See e. christi cunningham, Preserving Normal Heterosexual Male Fantasy: The "Severe or
Pervasive" Missed-Interpretation of Sexual Harassment in the Absence of a Tangible Job Consequence,
1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 262 (stating "[i]n other words, in [hostile environment cases],
the Court requires a higher degree of discrimination, explicitly permitting some discrimi-
nation because of sex. This interpretation produces an inconsistency that departs from the
language of the statute."). Courts also apply the severe or pervasive standard to other bases
for hostile environment harassment. See infra Section lI.B.
12. cunningham, supra note 11, at 261-62. This is not to say that all inappropriate
conduct should be deemed sexual harassment. Some conduct is too trivial to be actiona-
ble. See infra text accompanying notes 132, 160 & 184-187 & 189 for discussions of trivial
examples of differential treatment.
13. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
14. See infra Section II.B for a discussion on how courts tolerate conduct in sexual
harassment cases that would not be tolerated in racial discrimination cases.
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harassment other than sexual harassment until recently,' 5 the Court
commented in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,' 6 that:
Courts of Appeals in sexual harassment cases have properly
drawn on standards developed in cases involving racial har-
assment. Although racial and sexual harassment will often
take different forms, and standards may not be entirely inter-
changeable, we think there is good sense in seeking gener-
ally to harmonize the standards of what amounts to
actionable harassment. 7
This statement aside, the Court had not specifically applied the same
standard to other types of harassment cases until it decided National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, in which it apparently assumed that
the severe or pervasive standard also applied in all hostile environ-
ment cases.1 " Nevertheless, most courts purport to apply the same
severe or pervasive standard to assess racial harassment.'9 Intolerable
conduct in racial harassment cases, however, is often much less egre-
15. Justice Thomas complained in his Ellerth dissent that the decision had treated em-
ployer liability for sexual harassment differently from racial harassment. 524 U.S. 742, 767
(1998) (Thomas,J., dissenting). The Court had not dealt directly with racial harassment at
that time. Recently, however, in a race-based harassment case, the Court decided that the
continuing violation theory applies to hostile environment harassment cases. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2068 (2002). The Court was apparently treat-
ing racial harassment the same as sexual harassment because it did not distinguish among
the types of hostile environment discrimination and cited the general standard of the sex-
ual harassment cases discussed in Morgan. See id. at 2073-74 (citing Clark County Sch. Dist.
v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per curiam); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
768 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
Prior to Morgan, the Supreme Court in deciding that racial harassment was not action-
able under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, said that in Meritor it had
implicitly approved the concept of racial harassment as discrimination, if the discrimina-
tion was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment." 491 U.S. 164, 180 (1989) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)), overruled in part by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(1994). The Court in Morgan also cited the severe or pervasive standard. Morgan, 122 S.
Ct. at 2074. See infra Sections I.E.5 and II.C.1 for a more elaborate discussion of the case.
16. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
17. Id. at 787 n.1 (internal citations omitted).
18. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. at 2074. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court did not use
the term sexual harassment, but rather purported to define a "discriminatorily abusive
work environment." 510 U.S. at 22. In Harris, the Court felt that the "very fact that the
discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abu-
sive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title
VII's broad rule of workplace equality." Id.
19. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
LAw 4546 (2d prtg. 1993) (describing courts of appeals cases that construe the Title VII
threshold for racial harassment in terms of the severity and frequency of offensive
conduct).
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gious than the conduct tolerated by the courts in sexual harassment
cases.
2 0
The concept of harassment causing a hostile employment envi-
ronment first developed in ethnic and racial harassment cases and was
ultimately adopted by analogy in sexual harassment cases.2 ' All of the
bases for discrimination under Title VII-race, sex, religion, color,
and national origin-are treated the same in the language of the stat-
ute, 2 2 which compels the conclusion that all types of hostile environ-
ment harassment should be treated the same.
Some commentators have expressed the fear that analyzing all
types of harassment the same as sexual harassment will make it harder
for claimants to prevail in racial harassment cases.2' These scholars
argue that requiring conduct to be severe or pervasive to be action-
able would be inappropriate in other types of harassment cases.2 4
While racial harassment is certainly reprehensible, it is no more de-
grading or demeaning than the sexual harassment described in this
Article,2 5 much of which the courts found not to be actionable.2 6
In sexual harassment cases, the conduct must be unwelcome.27
Once the element of "unwelcomeness" is proven in a sexual harass-
20. See infra Section II.B for a comparison of sexual and racial harassment cases.
21. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 n.1 (noting that the standards for racial harassment
form an appropriate basis for sexual harassment standards).
22. The single exception is that the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) de-
fense does not apply to race but only to sex, religion, and national origin. JOEL W. FRIED-
MAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 173 (5th ed.
2001). This seems to be the result of a failure of congressional foresight. Of course one
can imagine such situations. Should not an actor seeking to play Thurgood Marshall be
black? Id.
23. E.g., L. Camille Hbert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 820 (1997) [hereinafter Hbert, Analogizing Race].
24. See id. at 878 (explaining that the severe or pervasive standard could lead courts to
rule that racially motivated behavior did not cross the Title VII threshold, even if the be-
havior was seriously damaging).
25. See Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a "Bitch"Just Don't Use the "N-Word" Some
Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Part Operations and Rodgers v. Western-
Southern Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 741, 775 (1997).
Others feel that sexual harassment damages its victims even more than the victims of
other types of harassment. Professor Estrich writes:
What makes sexual harassment more offensive, more debilitating, and more de-
humanizing to its victims than other forms of discrimination is precisely the fact
that it is sexual. Not only are men exercising power over women, but they are
operating in a realm which is still judged according to a gender double-standard,
itself a reflection of the extent to which sexuality is used to penalize women.
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 820 (1991).
26. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-68 (1986).
27. Id. For a discussion of the issue of "unwelcomeness," see Mary F. Radford, By Invita-
tion Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REv. 499 (1994).
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ment case, there is no reason to treat racial and sexual harassment
differently. The Supreme Court's severe or pervasive test, along with
the lower courts' interpretation of the standard of what constitutes a
hostile environment, requires too much for any type of harassment
case. Applying the severe or pervasive standard, as it is applied in sex-
ual harassment cases, to cases of racial harassment highlights the inad-
visability of the standard. If racial harassment were analyzed in the
same way as many courts analyze sexual harassment, the need for a
better-reasoned approach would become evident.
This Article explores the history of employment discrimination
and harassment generally in Section I. Section II examines lower
court cases decided after the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
"severe or pervasive" standard in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. Finally,
Section III provides the analysis.
I. HISTORY
A. Early Decisions Under Title VII
Under Title VII,28 an aggrieved employee must file a charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(the EEOC).29 The EEOC then investigates the charge and decides
whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the employer dis-
criminated.3 ° The earliest discussions of hostile environment as a type
of harassment first occurred in reasonable cause findings by the
EEOC, which preceded the courts in recognizing that creation of an
28. Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 originally was based on the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). Judith J. Johnson, Rebuilding the Barriers: The Trend in Employment
Discrimination Class Actions, 19 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987). The NLRA generally
protects the rights of employees to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in strikes and
other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). The
NLRA also prohibits discrimination on the basis of union activity "in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment." Id. § 158(a) (3).
The phrase "term or condition" of employment has been interpreted very broadly
under the NLRA, especially under the collective bargaining provisions of the NLRA, that
explain when an employer and union have to bargain about an issue. Id. § 158(d). For
example, in Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court found that changing the price of
food in the plant is changing a "term or condition" of employment under the NLRA, so
the employer was required to bargain about it. 441 U.S. 448, 490 (1979). The National
Labor Relations Board also has held that such things as coffee benefits and free meals may
be considered terms and conditions of employment. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOY-
MENT LAw, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 880 (Patrick Hartin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992). Thus,
the Supreme Court and the NLRB have interpreted "terms or conditions" of employment
broadly in labor cases. A similar reading of "terms or conditions" of employment would
seem to be appropriate under the NLRA's progeny-Tide VII.
29. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKER, supra note 22, at 409.
30. Id.
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abusive working environment on the basis of race was discrimina-
tory." These early attempts at defining the area are virtually
forgotten.
Rogers v. EEOC12 was the first case to discuss in detail a cause of
action for harassment that created a hostile environment under Title
VII. 3 In the 1971 case of first impression, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit considered whether the plaintiff could allege discrim-
ination not directed at her, but at her employer's patients.3 4 The
plaintiff alleged that because the patients were segregated by national
origin, she suffered from discrimination.3 5 The Fifth Circuit recog-
nized the cause of action and said:
[E]mployees' psychological as well as economic fringes are
statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse, and
that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment" in Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps
within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working
environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimi-
nation. I do not wish to be interpreted as holding that an
employer's mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet
which engenders offensive feelings in an employee falls
within the proscription of Section 703. But by the same to-
ken I am simply not willing to hold that a discriminatory at-
mosphere could under no set of circumstances ever
constitute an unlawful employment practice. One can read-
ily envision working environments so heavily polluted with
31. In 1969, the EEOC issued a reasonable cause finding concerning an employee who
was the "object of racial insults by certain members assigned to the same department....
Tide VII requires an employer to maintain a working environment free of racial intimida-
tion." Case No. YSF 9-108, Employment Practices (CCH) 6030 (Decision of Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, June 26, 1969). Similarly, in another decision, the
charging party alleged that his supervisor regularly referred to Negro employees by using
the epithet "nigger." The EEOC explained:
An employer is responsible for the behavior of its agents within the course of
their employment. It is also obliged under this Act to maintain a working atmos-
phere free of racial intimidation or insult .... That the racial insults were not
directed to Charging Party, but to his fellow employees renders the act no less a
violation.
Decision No. 71-969, Employment Practices (CCH) 6193 (Decision of Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, Dec. 24, 1970).
32. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
33. Id. at 236. However, the EEOC had issued earlier decisions holding that a hostile
environment was actionable under Title VII. See supra note 31.




discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers .... 36
Rogers is not only the judicial origin of hostile environment harass-
ment, but this frequently cited dicta also is the origin of the idea that
the harassment must be so severe as to pervade the working atmos-
phere and cause psychological damage to the employee.37 The facts
in Rogers were hardly of that magnitude. The plaintiff complained
about the effect that discrimination against patients of her national
origin had on her employment.
38
The dicta in Rogers was one judge's idea that was taken out of
context, and has not been seriously reconsidered since, but has
merely been adopted as "the law" by the courts. 9 The idea that there
should have to be a separate genre for hostile environment discrimi-
nation also apparently had its origin in the Rogers case and was further
reinforced by scholarship and the EEOC guidelines issued in 1980.4o
Although the recognition of abusive environment as the violation
of a term or condition of employment was revolutionary at the time,
the dicta the Rogers court used is still cited as if it were authoritative.
The facts of the Rogers case, however, might not be sufficiently severe
or pervasive to constitute hostile environment harassment as it is inter-
preted today, in part because of the dicta the court used to envision a
hypothetical egregious hostile environment that did not purport to
apply to the facts before the court.4 1
Despite the Rogers decision and other decisions involving racial
and national origin harassment, sexual harassment was not recog-
nized as discrimination on the basis of sex until 1976 in Williams v.
Saxbe. 2 Prior to this decision, sexual harassment was considered to be
unrelated to employment, but rather in the nature of a supervisory
frolic and detour.4 3 Before the Supreme Court dealt with sexual har-
assment, however, the scholarship, the courts, and the EEOC had in-
36. Id. at 238.
37. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (attempting to dispel the
motion that Rogers requires psychological injury for a successful Title VII claim).
38. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 236-37.
39. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (extending the
description of hostile environment in Rogers to sexual harassment cases).
40. See id. at 65-66 (stating that the EEOC's decision to include hostile work environ-
ment under Title VII's umbrella evolved from substantial case law and EEOC precedent).
41. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (describing the less psychologically
harsh circumstances in Rogers).
42. 413 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D.D.C. 1976); seeLINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 19, at 13.
43. See, e.g., L. Camille H6bert, The Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment for Women,
KAN.J.L. & PUB. Pol'Y, Spring 1994, at 42, 51 n.19 (describing early cases in which sexual
harassment was not found to be actionable).
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jected some conceptual problems into the area by treating sexual
harassment differently from other types of harassment.
B. EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment
The EEOC issued guidelines on sexual harassment in 1980." 4
The guidelines were necessary to recognize the cause of action, but
ironically may have solidified the conceptual problem of treating sex-
ual harassment differently from other types of harassment by defining
sexual harassment as something related only to unwelcome sexual ad-
vances and not to other types of gender harassment.45 The guidelines
also recognized a distinction between sexual harassment and other
kinds of harassment, and the EEOC has continued to maintain that
sexual harassment should be treated separately because sexual harass-
ment "raises issues about human interaction that are to some extent
unique in comparison to other harassment and, thus, may warrant
separate emphasis. 46 The EEOC guidelines further recognized quid
pro quo and hostile environment harassment as separate categories of
sexual harassment.4 Since the EEOC singled out sexual harassment
44. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 19, at 30. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sex-
ual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998) for a history of the concept of sexual harassment.
45. See Schultz, supra note 44, at 1686 (stating that the early development of sexual
harassment law was sufficient for quid pro quo harassment but "exclude[d] from legal
understanding many of the most common and debilitating forms of harassment"). The
EEOC rules reflect the two legal categories of sexual harassment-quid pro quo and offen-
sive working environment-described in Catharine MacKinnon's book on the subject.
Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA Wo-
MEN'S L.J. 37, 39 (1993) (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979)).
Professor H~bert explained why the EEOC should have defined harassment related to
sex in another way:
Gender harassment-hostile and denigrating nonsexual activity directed at wo-
men because they are women (or at men because they are men)-differs from
sexual harassment-sexual activity directed at women because they are women
(or at men because they are men) often motivated by hostility and intended to be
denigrating-only in the choice of weapon used. Both types of activity are moti-
vated by the same purpose-to inform women of their place and role in the
workforce-and have similar effects-to offend, humiliate, and embarrass.
L. Camille H~bert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 565, 567
(1995). The author also points out that different standards are applied to sexual harass-
ment that are not applied to gender and other types of harassment. Id. at 576.
46. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Ori-
gin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,267 (proposed Oct. 1, 1993) (withdrawn 59
Fed. Reg. 51,396 (Oct. 11, 1994)).
47. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (2001). Some
disagree with EEOC's separate categories of sexual harassment. See Eugene Scalia, The
Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 307 (1998)
(discussing quid pro quo harassment). Scalia queries, "[w]hy did retaliatory job action
require its own Latin name and 'category' to be recognized as sex discrimination? ... The
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as a separate type of discrimination, the courts followed suit.48 The
guidelines defined sexual harassment as follows:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Section 703 of
Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to
such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creat-
ing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment. 49
Shortly after the sexual harassment guidelines were issued, the
Commission issued guidelines on national origin discrimination that
included guidelines on national origin harassment.5 ° The guidelines
on national origin harassment did not create the dichotomy that the
EEOC created in sexual harassment between quid pro quo and hostile
answer seems to be that in the 1970s some employers argued-and some courts agreed-
that sexually-motivated conduct was 'personal."' Id. at 310. The author argues that sepa-
rate treatment for quid pro quo harassment is no longer necessary. Id. at 313-14; see also
Steven H. Aden, "Harm in Asking": A Reply to Eugene Scalia and an Analysis of the Paradigm
Shift in the Supreme Court's Title VII Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS.
L. REv. 477 (1999) (considering the impact of Eugene Scalia's critique of the quid pro quo
category).
48. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986) (discussing
and following EEOC guidelines for sexual harassment).
49. Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (footnote omitted).
50. Id. § 1606.8. The Commission had issued earlier guidelines on national origin dis-
crimination, but those did not refer to harassment. Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1979). The guidelines proposed in 1993 on all types
of harassment would have superseded the national origin guidelines. Guidelines on Har-
assment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58
Fed. Reg. at 51,267.
In the national origin guidelines, the Commission defined national origin discrimina-
tion as "the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual's, or his or
her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or lin-
guistic characteristics of a national origin group." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2001). The guide-
lines defined national origin harassment as follows:
Ethnic slurs and other verbal or physical conduct relating to an individual's
national origin constitute harassment when this conduct:
(1) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offen-
sive working environment;
(2) Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individ-
ual's work performance; or
(3) Otherwise adversely affects an individual's employment opportunities.
Id. § 1606.8(b).
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environment harassment because quid pro quo ethnic harassment is
unlikely to occur.5 Also, the national origin guidelines did not re-
quire proof of unwelcomeness on the assumption that such harass-
ment would always be unwelcome;5 2 however, the guidelines retained
the idea that hostile environment harassment is a genre separate from
other acts of discrimination.53
C. Supreme Court Decisions that Established and Clarified the
"Severe or Pervasive" Requirement
The Supreme Court did not review the sexual harassment guide-
lines or deal with harassment until it considered Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson in 1986, so the lower courts defined sexual harassment on
their own. One lower court decision, Henson v. City of Dundee,54 had a
profound impact on the law of sexual harassment.
In Henson v. Dundee, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower
court's holding that the plaintiffs claim for a hostile sexual harass-
ment environment did not violate Title VII.55 The court stated:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive envi-
ronment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary
barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harass-
ment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man
or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets.
56
Unfortunately, the court followed up its recognition of hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment with the following:
The harassment complained of affected a "term, condition, or privi-
lege" of employment. The former [F]ifth [C]ircuit has held that
the state of psychological well being is a term, condition, or
privilege of employment within the meaning of Title VII."
The court in Rogers made it clear, however, that the "mere
utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders of-
51. Cf Aden, supra note 47, at 486 (suggesting that there is no special favor a supervi-
sor could demand of an employee in a racial context correlative to sexual factors in a
gender context).
52. Cf Hbert, Analogizing Race, supra note 23, at 849-53 (comparing the notion of
welcomeness in sexual and racial discrimination).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(b)(1).
54. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 911-13. The Eleventh Circuit had recently been created by splitting the Fifth
Circuit, the circuit that decided Rogers. JACK BAss, UNLIKELY HEROES 329-31 (1981).
56. Henson, 682 F.2d at 902 (footnote omitted).
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fensive feelings in an employee" does not affect the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment to a sufficiently sig-
nificant degree to violate Title VII. For sexual harassment to
state a claim under Title VII, it must be sufficiently pervasive so
as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work-
ing environment. Whether sexual harassment at the workplace is
sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psycho-
logical well being of employees is a question to be deter-
mined with regard to the totality of circumstances.57
Thus, the idea that harassment must be severe or pervasive originated
with the Henson case. 5' The Supreme Court in Meitor Savings Bank,
FS.B. v. Vinson, however, used the disjunctive, "severe or pervasive, '5 9
instead of the conjunctive, "severe and persistent," used by Henson to
describe whether the harassment is "sufficiently pervasive so as to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment. "60
1. Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson.-In 1986, the Su-
preme Court recognized hostile environment sexual harassment as a
type of discrimination based on sex for the first time. 61 The case in-
volved particularly egregious conduct in which the plaintiff, a female
bank teller, was forcibly raped by her supervisor on several occa-
sions.6 2 He also fondled her in front of other employees and de-
manded sex on numerous occasions to which the plaintiff agreed
because she was afraid of losing herjob.6' The trial court said that the
57. Id. at 904 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (second emphasis added).
58. BARBARA LINDEMAN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 487
(PhilipJ. Pfeiffer et al. eds., 3d ed. 2000 Supp.).
59. 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (emphasis added).
60. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (emphasis added). After Henson and Meritor, many courts
adopted the requirement that the harassment had to be so severe or pervasive that it dam-
aged the psychological welfare of the employee. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
20 (1993) (explaining the circuit split that had arisen over this issue). The requirement
that the harassment be sufficient to affect the psychological welfare of the employee was
also suggested in Henson. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,
238 (5th Cir. 1971)). Although the Harris Court said that harassment did not have to be so
severe or pervasive that it caused psychological damage, the Court retained the require-
ment that the conduct must be "severe or pervasive" to be actionable. Harris, 510 U.S. at
22.
61. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. This was also the first time the Supreme Court had ad-
dressed any form of sexual harassment.
62. Id. at 60.
63. Id.
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relationship, if there was one, was voluntary and had nothing to do
with her employment.64
The defendant argued that an allegation of sexual harassment,
that did not result in a tangible economic loss, did not violate Title
VII.65 The Supreme Court recognized that "the language of Title VII
is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination. The phrase
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment evinces a congres-
sional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women in employment."66 The Court further noted that the
EEOC guidelines provided that harassment resulting in non-eco-
nomic injury also violates Title VII and that the guidelines prohibited
quid pro quo harassment, as well as hostile environment harass-
ment.67 In addition, the Court cited Rogers v. EEOC, which first recog-
nized that harassment on the basis of national origin could create a
hostile or abusive working environment.6" The Court noted that since
Rogers, courts commonly recognized that racial and national origin
harassment created a hostile working environment and violated Title
VII. 69 The Court said that "[n] othing in Title VII suggests that a hos-
tile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment should
not be likewise prohibited."7 However, the Court noted that not all
workplace harassment affects a term or condition of employment.71
The Court, adopting language from Henson, held that to be actiona-
ble, the behavior must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive work-
ing environment."72 Without question, the conduct in the Meritor
case was sufficient to be actionable under any standard.73
Furthermore, the Court quoted Rogers, in which the Fifth Circuit
said, "[o] ne can readily envision working environments so heavily pol-
luted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
64. Id. at 61. Furthermore, the court said that, in any event, the defendant bank could
not be held liable because the plaintiff never complained. Id. at 62.
65. Id. at 64.
66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 65.
68. 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
69. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67.
70. Id. at 67. The Court also noted that other courts had uniformly agreed that a
violation of Title VII may be established by proving that a hostile work environment re-
sulted from discrimination based on sex. Id. at 66.
71. Id. at 67.
72. Id. (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). The Court
modified Henson's holding that behavior must be "sufficiently severe and persistent," Hen-
son, 682 F.2d at 904, to "sufficiently severe or pervasive." Menitor, 477 U.S. at 67.
73. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
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psychological stability of minority group workers."74 After Meritors
characterization that actionable harassment had to be severe or perva-
sive, along with the quote from Rogers regarding psychological dam-
age, many courts adopted the view that sexual harassment does not
alter a term or condition of employment unless the employee suffers
psychological or physical detriment as a result of the harassment.75
The Court felt compelled to attempt to clarify the standard in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc. 76
2. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.-In Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., the trial court found that the employer's conduct was not so se-
vere as to seriously affect the plaintiff's psychological well-being. 77
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 7' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether "abusive work environ-
ment harassment" must cause the plaintiff to suffer injury or seriously
affect her psychological well-being. 79 The Court said it was taking a
middle view between the latter view that conduct must cause tangible
psychological injury and the view that any objectionable conduct is
actionable.80 To be severe or pervasive enough to alter terms or con-
74. Id. at 66 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
75. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993) (noting a split in the
circuit courts on whether conduct to be actionable had to seriously affect psychological
well being).
76. Id. For a criticism of Harris, see Anne C. Levy, The United States Supreme Court Opin-
ion in Harris v. Forklift Systems: "Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing," 43 U. KAN. L.
REv. 275, 275 (1995) (explaining that the Court in Harris "abdicat[ed] its responsibility to
give guidance to the lower courts in an area in which a variety of vital issues need
clarification").
77. Harris, 510 U.S. at 20.
78. Id.
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff in Harris was a manager of
Forklift Systems, an equipment rental company, of which Hardy was president. Id. at 19.
The Supreme Court explained the magistrate's findings in the following way:
[T]hroughout Harris' time at Forklift, Hardy often insulted her because of her
gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendoes. Hardy
told Harris on several occasions, in the presence of other employees, "You're a
woman, what do you know" and "We need a man as the rental manager"; at least
once, he told her she was a "dumb ass woman." Again in front of others, he
suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris']
raise." Hardy occasionally asked Harris and other female employees to get coins
from his front pants pocket. He threw objects on the ground in front of Harris
and other women, and asked them to pick the objects up. He made sexual innu-
endoes about Harris' and other women's clothing.
Id. (citations omitted). Harris complained, and Hardy promised to stop. Shortly thereaf-
ter, however, he commented to her in front of others, in reference to a transaction she was
arranging, "What did you do, promise the guy.., some [sex] Saturday night?" Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. at 21.
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ditions of employment, the harassment must "create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasona-
ble person would find hostile or abusive," but need not lead to physi-
cal or psychological impairment."' The Court said that a hostile
environment might detract from an employee's work performance
and career advancement, but even absent these consequences, the
fact that the pervasiveness and severity of the discriminatory conduct
exposed the employees to an abusive work environment due to their
gender violated Title VII's clear proscription of workplace inequality.
The Court said that the following factors could be considered in mak-
ing the determination: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with
an employee's work performance." 2 This list, however, provided a
non-exhaustive sampling of types and patterns of behavior that a court
might consider in a sexual harassment case.8 3
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence contains the best analysis of the
issue. Discrimination depends on "whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed." 4 In order to prove
discrimination in the hostile environment situation, the plaintiff must
show that the hostile environment unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiffs job. Justice Ginsburg believes that "the plaintiff must only
show that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory con-
duct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered
working conditions as to 'ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job"'8 5
than would a person of the opposite sex. Justice Ginsburg believed
that the majority's opinion was not inconsistent with her view.86
81. Id. at 21-23. The Court added that the plaintiff must subjectively perceive the envi-
ronment as abusive. Id. at 21.
82. Id. at 23.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
85. Id. (citing Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir.1988)). Justice
Scalia also concurred, bemoaning his and the Court's inability to find a more concrete
standard. Id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg referenced her analysis from
a lower court decision involving racial harassment, noting that Title VII treats race and sex
discrimination virtually the same. Id. at 25-26 (citing Davis, 858 F.2d at 349). As Justice
Ginsburg noted, there is one difference between race and other bases for discrimination
under Title VII: the bona fide occupational qualification defense does not apply to race




Because the Court in Harris disapproved of the requirement that
the employee suffer damage to her psychological welfare, the Court
must have intended to disapprove of the high level of harassment the
courts were requiring at that time for an actionable claim. The Court
explained:
Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a
reasonable person's psychological well-being, but the statute
is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment
would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile
or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically
injurious.8 7
Many lower courts apparently did not accept this guidance, and, al-
though they no longer require proof of psychological damage, many
courts still require a level of harassment that would be sufficient to
cause psychological damage. 8
Although Harris dealt with a case of sexual harassment, the Court
appeared to be covering all types of abusive environment harassment,
whether based on "race, gender, religion, or national origin."8 9 The
concurrences focused primarily on sex discrimination, 90 but the ma-
jority did not limit its analysis to sexual harassment.9 ' After Harris, the
EEOC attempted to articulate a definition of all kinds of
harassment.
92
D. Proposed Guidelines on All Types of Harassment
In 1993, the EEOC proposed guidelines governing all types of
harassment, other than sexual harassment.9" These guidelines were
subsequently withdrawn because of unfavorable comments, especially
with regard to religious harassment.9 4 The proposed guidelines cov-
ered race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, and disability
harassment, and defined such harassment as "verbal or physical con-
87. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (citation omitted).
88. See, e.g., Crenshaw v. Delray Farms, Inc. 968 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (provid-
ing a particularly egregious example of a work environment heavily tainted by sexually
explicit harassment in which the court did not find a violation of Title VII).
89. 510 U.S. at 22.
90. Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 25-26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
91. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-23 (referring to Harris as a case of abusive environment
harassment rather than sexual harassment).
92. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Ori-
gin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,269 (proposed Oct. 1, 1993) (withdrawn 59
Fed. Reg. 51,396 (Oct. 11, 1994)).
93. Id. at 51,267.
94. See LINDEMAN & GROSSMAN, supra note 58, at 475-79 (discussing religious, age, and
disability harassment).
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duct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward an individ-
ual because of his/her race, color, religion, gender, national origin,
age, or disability, or that of his/her relatives, friends, or associates."95
Furthermore, the guidelines would have required that the conduct
have "the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment; of unreasonably interfering with an indi-
vidual's work performance; . . . [or] [o] therwise adversely affect[ing]
an individual's employment opportunities. 96
In addressing the issue of how severe or pervasive the conduct
had to be to constitute harassment, the guidelines restated the stan-
dard articulated in Harris, that the conduct must be so sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive that "a reasonable person in the same or similar
circumstances would find the conduct intimidating, hostile, or abu-
sive." 7 The guidelines added the following: "The 'reasonable person'
standard includes consideration of the perspective of persons of the
alleged victim's race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or
disability. It is not necessary to make an additional showing of psycho-
logical harm."9
In a footnote, the guidelines gave examples of offending con-
duct, such as dressing a Hispanic prisoner in a straw hat with a sign
saying "spic."99 Another footnote gave examples of sporadic conduct
that could be considered severe enough to constitute harassment: a
supervisor's infrequent use of the word "nigger" and a supervisor's
95. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Ori-
gin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,269. The proposed guidelines also provided that:
Harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age or
disability constitutes discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment and, as such, violates title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (title VII); the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. (ADEA); the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (ADA); or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., as applicable.
Id at 51,268-69 (a).
96. Id. at 51,269. The guidelines also included the following examples of proscribed
conduct:
(i) Epithets, slurs, negative stereotyping, or threatening, intimidating, or
hostile acts, that relate to race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or
disability; and
(ii) Written or graphic material that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion
toward an individual or group because of race, color, religion, gender, national
origin, age, or disability and that is placed on walls, bulletin boards, or elsewhere




99. Id. at n.3.
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comment that "you Black guys are too f***ing dumb to be insurance
agents,"100 as well as a single performance of a Ku Klux Klan ritual.'01
The guidelines were intended to supersede the Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of National Origin, but not the guidelines on
sexual harassment because sexual harassment involves inherently
unique issues relating to human interaction that may warrant respec-
tively unique treatment.'1° The guidelines also indicated in a foot-
note that they covered "forms of harassment that are gender-based
but non-sexual in nature."1 3 After the EEOC withdrew the guidelines
on all types of harassment,10 4 it did not attempt to define "severe or
pervasive" further.0 5 The Supreme Court did not deal with the sub-
ject again until 1998.
E. Other Supreme Court Cases that Impact the Determination
of Hostile Environment
In 1998, the Court issued three opinions that impacted the defi-
nition of hostile environment. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., the Court said that under certain circumstances, the employer
could be liable for same-sex harassment.10 6 In Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth and in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Supreme Court
defined the standard for employer liability for supervisory harass-
ment.0 7 In discussing these issues, the Court shed some light on what
conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable. Two other
100. Id. n.4 (citing Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628, 631 (E.D. Wis.
1992)).
101. Id. (citing Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 n.4 (7th Cir. 1991)).
102. Id. at 51,267.
103. Id. at 51,267 n.2. EEOC provided two cases to support its gender versus sexual
harassment distinction: (1) Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988)
(providing that "harassment that is not of a sexual nature but would not have occurred but
for the sex of the victim is actionable under Title VII"); and (2) Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (explaining that "harassing behavior
lacking sexually explicit content but directed at women and motivated by animus against
women [is sex discrimination]"). Id.
104. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Ori-
gin, Age, or Disability, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (Oct. 11, 1994) (withdrawing proposed
guidelines).
105. However, the EEOC issued enforcement guidance after Harris, indicating that the
case was consistent with its present policy. EEOC, No. 915.002, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TUNITY COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON HARRis V. FORK-
LIFr Svs., INC. (1994), 1994 WL 1747814, at *3.
106. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
107. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (holding that employers
are "subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environ-
ment created by a supervisor with intermediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee"); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
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recently decided cases, Clark County School District v. Breeden' and Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,"°9 will also have a significant
impact on hostile environment cases because of the severe or perva-
sive requirement.
1. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.-In Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court was faced with a
situation in which a male plaintiff had allegedly been the target of sex-
related, humiliating conduct by other male employees, and was physi-
cally assaulted by two male employees in a sexual manner, one of the
men threatening to rape the plaintiff."' 0 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that same-sex harassment was not actionable."]
The Supreme Court disagreed, adopting Justice Ginsburg's view in
Harris that "[t]he critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or condi-
tions of employment to which members of the other sex are not ex-
posed." '12 To be actionable, the Court said, sexual harassment must
be because of the plaintiffs sex.11 ' Although in a same-sex harass-
ment case the inference may be harder to draw than in most female-
male harassment cases, it is still possible.
The question in Oncale concerned the viability of a claim of same-
sex harassment; however, the Court also commented on the nature of
the conduct that would constitute harassment." 4 The Court noted
that the harassment must be severe or pervasive "to ensure that courts
and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace-such
as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation-for discrimina-
tory conditions of employment."' 15 The Court again reiterated that
the reasonable plaintiff standard must be used to judge the harass-
ment." '6 The Court went on to explain that:
108. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
109. 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002).
110. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
113. Id. at 80-81. One author explains that the Oncale decision expands the universe of
sexual harassment claims to include gender-motivated harassment. Henry L. Chambers,
Jr., A Unifying Theory of Sex Discrimination, 34 GA. L. REV. 1591, 1592-93 (2000). He argues
that sexual harassment claims and disparate treatment claims may no longer be "doctri-
nally distinct." Id. at 1593.
114. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
115. Id. at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. Much has been written about who the reasonable person should be. There is a
good argument that, in the case of sexual harassment of a woman, the standard should be
a reasonable woman. See Levy, supra note 76, at 295 (inquiring "[h]ow are plaintiffs to
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In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that [reasonable
person] inquiry requires careful consideration of the social
context in which particular behavior occurs and is exper-
ienced by its target. A professional football player's working
environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for exam-
ple, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads
onto the field-even if the same behavior would reasonably
be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or
female) back at the office.' 17
As in the other Supreme Court decisions on sexual harassment, it
does not appear that the court had in mind harassment that is as se-
vere or pervasive as the term suggests, at least not to the extent that
many lower courts require.'
18
2. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.-Ellerth and its compan-
ion case, Faragher, defined the scope of supervisory liability. That defi-
nition had an important impact on hostile environment sexual
harassment. In Ellerth, the Court was principally concerned with de-
fining employer liability for supervisory conduct." 9 However, the
prove that the environment makes it more difficult for them to do their jobs without neces-
sarily producing evidence of the psychological harm such environments have on people of
this gender?").
The view I prefer is that the standard should be a reasonable person in the plaintiffs
situation taking into account fundamental characteristics, like race and sex. See Nichols v.
Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the "reasonable person" can be
defined by sex, or by other immutable traits possessed by the person making the harass-
ment charge); Tam B. Tran, Title VII Hostile Work Environment: A Different Perspective, 9 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 357, 367 (1998) (noting that a minority of courts have also used a
reasonable person standard that takes into account the characteristics of the victim). Tran
suggests even the reasonable woman standard is inadequate because it is based on the
white woman's experience. Id. at 366. Her view is supported by the statement in Oncale
that conduct should be that "which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find
severely hostile or abusive." 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (emphasis added).
Others have analyzed the issue as well. See Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of
Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 95, 123-24 (1992) (discussing the ongoing debate over the reasonable person perspec-
tive used when evaluating harassment claims); H~bert, Analogizing Race, supra note 23, at
853-62 (discussing the different perspectives from which an actionable claim of harassment
should be judged); George Rutherglen, Sexual Harassment: Ideology or Law?, 18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 487, 497 (1995) (citing empirical evidence that men and women react differ-
ently to sexual advances and arguing that some account should be taken of a person's
gender when evaluating severe or pervasive).
117. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; see, e.g., Blough v. Hawkins Mkt., Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 858,
862-64 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (finding that when a male co-worker touched the female plaintiff
on the buttocks and crotch and another male co-worker made several sexual advances over
several months, although the court said this behavior could be offensive to a reasonable
person, it was not severe or pervasive enough to give rise to a hostile work environment).
118. See infra Section II.
119. 524 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1998).
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Court discussed the two types of sexual harassment, quid pro quo and
hostile environment, 12' broadening the scope of the latter. 121 The
Court said that if the plaintiff can prove that a tangible employment
action occurred as a result of her refusal to submit to her supervisor's
sexual demands, she has proven an actionable change in a term or
condition of employment. However, for any action that precedes a
tangible employment action, the plaintiff must prove that the conduct
was severe or pervasive.
The Court defined "tangible employment action" as one that
"constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different re-
sponsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in bene-
fits." '12 2  Any other type of employment action or threatened
employment action would be treated the same as hostile environment
discrimination, if it is actionable at all. 123
In terms of liability, the Court decided that an employer would be
strictly liable for tangible employment actions taken by a supervisor, as
opposed to hostile environment claims, for which the employer would
be liable unless he can prove an affirmative defense. 24 The employer
must prove "[first,] that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
[second,] that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take ad-
120. Id. at 751-54.
121. Id. at 754. The question was whether the supervisor's unfulfilled threats of not
promoting the plaintiff constituted hostile environment or quid pro quo harassment. Id.
at 751.
122. Id. at 761 (emphasis added). The Court cited the following as examples of signifi-
cant tangible employment actions: termination, pay cuts, demotion, significant loss of ben-
efits, significant removal ofjob responsibilities, as well as others. Id. (citing Crady v. Liberty
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)). The following were cited as
examples of insignificant employment actions: a "bruised ego," demotion without change
in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige; and reassignment to less convenientjob. Id. (citations
omitted). The Court also said that a tangible employment action will usually cause direct
economic harm. Id. at 762.
The Court said that the employer is liable for sexual harassment by its supervisors
when an agency relationship assists the supervisor in his or her harassment. Id. at 759.
When the supervisory action involves a tangible employment action, the supervisor's em-
ployer-employee relationship with the company automatically helps the supervisor commit
harassment because the supervisor has the power to take tangible employment action. Id.
at 760-62. However, the Court felt it is more difficult to detect agency relationships that
aid a supervisor in harassment that do not end in a tangible employment action. Id. at 763.
123. Id. at 753-54. Whether it is actionable or not would depend on whether it is suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive. Id. at 754.
124. Id. at 765.
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vantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer to avoid the harm otherwise."'125
The principal impact of Ellerth, for the purposes of defining hos-
tile environment, is that the Court expanded hostile environment to
include threats to take tangible action and tangible action that is not
"significant," which had generally been classified as quid pro quo and
automatically actionable without assessing whether the conduct was
severe or pervasive.' 26 Also, the Court again selected hostile environ-
ment discrimination for distinctive treatment by establishing that the
employer has an affirmative defense to supervisory liability for hostile
environment harassment if the employer can show that the employee
unreasonably failed to complain about the conduct.127 This puts the
burden on the employee to assess whether she is being subjected to
actionable sexual harassment, which, as we will see, is often not
clear. 128 Furthermore, the employee must overcome the understand-
able reticence and embarrassment that victims of sexual harassment
feel, as well as the usual fear any complaining employee has of suffer-
ing detrimental consequences.
1 29
3. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.-Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
was a companion case to Ellerth and reiterated its principles regarding
employer liability.' The Court also discussed what constitutes a hos-
tile environment and stated that despite certain differences between
"racial and sexual harassment, and although standards may not be en-
tirely interchangeable, . . .there is good sense in seeking generally to
harmonize the standards of what amounts to actionable harass-
ment."' 3  The Court further explained that if the standards for hos-
125. Id.
126. See id. at 754-60.
127. Id. at 765.
128. See infra Section II (providing cases involving egregious conduct in which the courts
found the conduct unactionable).
129. See, e.g., H6bert, Analogizing Race, supra note 23, at 849. Professor HCbert explains
that, in most sexual harassment cases, women are relatively powerless and that com-
plaining about sexual harassment takes a gift of assertiveness that they often do not pos-
sess. Furthermore, they are aware that if they complain about sexual harassment, they may
be disciplined or discharged. Id. at 852. In addition, "'[o]ne can expect that a potential
claimant will pause long before enduring the humiliation of making public the indignities
which she has suffered in private, as well as the anticipated claims that she has 'consented,'
and attempts to trivialize her concerns."' Id. at 856 n.167 (quoting Mitchell v. OsAir, 629
F. Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio 1986)).
130. 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). The Court held that "an employer is vicariously liable for
actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, but subject to an affirmative defense
looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of the victim." Id.
131. Id. at 787 n.1 (citations omitted). The Court recently cited the severe or pervasive
standard as the standard in a racial harassment case under Tide VII. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
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tile environment are properly applied they will filter out cases
involving the type of poor behavior that occur sporadically in typical
workplaces.1
3 2
It is clear in reading the foregoing that the Supreme Court never
intended to condone the level of conduct tolerated by many lower
courts. 1' The Court's mistake was in not changing the wording of
the standard. The term "severe or pervasive" connotes more serious
conduct than the Court intended. Some of the language in the
Faragher case illustrates this. The Court described as non-actionable,
conduct "such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related
jokes, and occasional teasing," and then said, " [w] e have made it clear
that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and
conditions of employment, and the Courts of Appeals [sic] have
heeded this view. '  As an example of extreme conduct the Court
cited two lower court cases."3 5 In one of the cases, Carrero v. New York
City Housing Authority,136 the defendant characterized the harassment
as trivial, consisting of "'two kisses, three arm strokes,' several degrad-
ing epithets, and other objectionable-but ultimately harmless-con-
duct." '137 However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected this argument, stating that an employee is entitled to seek
Title VII remedies without subjecting herself to an "extended period
of demeaning and degrading provocation.' 3 8 Unfortunately, many
courts do not follow the Second Circuit's view and require instead
that a woman must be subjected to an extended period of often severe
abuse to be entitled to seek a remedy.
The inference in Faragher is that "severe or pervasive" lies just be-
yond sporadic language, jokes, and occasional teasing. However, the
Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2074 (2002). See infra Sections I.E.5 and II.C.1 for a
discussion of the case.
132. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
133. See infra Section II (discussing lower courts' interpretations of "severe or pervasive"
compared to the Supreme Court's view and how in effect lower courts require conduct to
be severe and pervasive).
134. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
135. Id.
136. 890 F.2d 569, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1989).
137. Id. at 578. The supervisor had touched the plaintiffs knee and kissed her neck
twice, referred to her as a "scarecrow," and attempted to kiss her on two other occasions.
Id. at 573. In the other case cited by the Court, Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th
Cir. 1986), the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment does not state a cause of action. Id. at 749-50. The Faragher
Court also cited LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 58, at 805-07 n.290 (collecting cases
in which summary judgment was approved by the courts of appeals because the conduct
was not sufficiently severe or pervasive). Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
138. Carrero, 890 F.2d at 578.
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conduct that many courts find not to be sufficiently severe or perva-
sive is clearly much more egregious than jokes, teasing, or sporadic
language.139 To make matters worse, the Court has recently further
disadvantaged the plaintiff who makes a mistake and complains about
such behavior.
4. Clark County School District v. Breeden.-In Clark County
School District v. Breeden, the plaintiff was allegedly retaliated against for
complaining about sexual harassment.14° The plaintiffs job required
her to screen job applicants.' In the course of her job duties, she
reviewed a report on an application that disclosed the applicant had
once said that "making love to you is like making love to the Grand
Canyon."1 42 When the plaintiffs male supervisor met with her and
another male employee about the applicant, the supervisor looked at
the plaintiff and said he did not know what the comment meant.143
The other male employee said he would tell the supervisor later, and
both men laughed. The plaintiff complained about this incident and
alleged that she was subsequently retaliated against as a result of her
complaint. 1
44
The lower court had employed the formula generally used by the
courts, that Title VII protects the plaintiff from retaliation for opposi-
tion to conduct that an employee could reasonably believe was illegal
under Title VII.' In the Breeden case, the Supreme Court noted that
Title VII forbids sexual harassment that is sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to create an abusive environment, and no one could reasonably
believe the single incident brought forward by the plaintiff violated
Title VII."14 While the holding has superficial appeal under the cir-
cumstances of the case, the Court has imputed to the plaintiff knowl-
edge of the legal standard, "severe or pervasive." Thus, if she makes
an incorrect assessment pursuant to the court's reasoning, she may be
exposing herself to retaliation with impunity by the employer. Com-
bining this case with Ellerth's requirement that, to hold the employer
liable for hostile environment harassment, the plaintiff must com-
139. Id.
140. 532 U.S. 268, 269-70 (2001) (per curiam).
141. Id. at 269.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 269-70.
145. Id. at 270. The lower court interpreted this to mean that the plaintiff must in good
faith believe the practices crossed the line of illegal sexual harassment. Id. The Court
otherwise declined to review the lower court's reasonable person standard for deciding
whether retaliation is actionable. Id.
146. Id. at 271.
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plain, 14 7 puts the plaintiff in an untenable position. In its most recent
decision on hostile environment harassment, National Railroad Passen-
ger Corp. v. Morgan, the Court improved the plaintiffs position
somewhat.
5. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.-In Morgan,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had granted the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the defendant
could not be liable for any act that occurred outside the limitations
period, including acts that allegedly constituted hostile environment
racial harassment, even though it continued into the limitations pe-
riod.'4 8 The Supreme Court decided that the continuing violation
theory149 applies to hostile environment claims, but not to other types
of discrimination claims involving discrete acts of discrimination, such
as discharge. 150
It is precisely because the entire hostile work environment
encompasses a single unlawful employment practice that we
do not hold, as have some of the Circuits, that the plaintiff
may not base a suit on individual acts that occurred outside
the statute of limitations unless it would have been unreason-
able to expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on
such conduct t 51
The Court said that, to determine whether a hostile environment ex-
ists, courts must look at "all the circumstances," including the factors
announced in a previous gender discrimination case: Harris v. Forklift
147. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also David Sherwyn
et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your "1-800" Harassment Hotline: An Empirical
Examination and Correction of the Haws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges,
69 FoRRiAM L. REv. 1265, 1266 (2001) (indicating that courts have held that if the em-
ployee does not complain within a month of commencement of the harassment, she is
acting unreasonably).
148. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2068 (2002) (describing
the appeals court's decision).
149. The continuing violation theory posits that some acts of discrimination have dis-
criminatory effects that extend the statute of limitations as long as the discriminatory ef-
fects last so that the violation "continues" until the discriminatory effect ceases. The courts
have recognized the continuing violation theory in only limited situations. See FRIEDMAN &
STRICKLER, supra note 22, at 448-49; LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 19, at 449.
150. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. at 2077. Morgan complained of numerous discriminatory and
retaliatory acts that began shortly after he was hired. Id. at 2068. The Court also said that
the continuing violation theory would not apply to discrete acts of discrimination, such as
failure to promote or discharge, even if such acts are related to acts alleged in a timely
fashion. Id. at 2071-72. The Court did note, however, that there is nothing in the statute
that bars evidence of such acts as background information. Id. at 2072.
151. Id. at 2075.
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Systems, Inc.1 52 The courts, therefore, must also consider acts that oc-
cur outside the filing period. However, the Court explained that the
defendant is not defenseless, stating that if the employee unreasona-
bly delays filing a charge, then waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling, and
laches may apply.1 53 The Court also noted other limitations: if the
claims are unrelated or no longer form part of the claim because of.
"certain intervening action by the employer.''15 4
Morgan is significant for two reasons. First, it marks the first time
the Court has decided a racial harassment case under Title VII, and,
while most courts assumed the same standard applied, this was the
first time the Court applied to a case of racial harassment the same
standard it had been applying to sexual harassment cases. Second,
many courts were refusing to apply the continuing violation theory to
cases of hostile environment discrimination, and the Court made it
clear that the continuing violation theory applies.
155
II. LOWER COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS OF "SEVERE OR PERVASIVE"
ArER THE HARis CASE
The objective of this Article is to demonstrate that the continued
use of the "severe or pervasive" standard can lead to anomalous re-
sults. For purposes of illustrating this point, this part cites some par-
ticularly egregious decisions, although there are other cases that apply
the standard more sensibly.
1 56
152. Id. at 2074 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
153. Id. at 2076.
154. Id. at 2075. The Court agreed with the appellate court in holding that the plain-
tiffs claims in this case were related because "'the pre- and post-limitations period inci-
dents involve[d] the same type of employment actions, occurred relatively frequently, and
were perpetrated by the same managers."' Id. at 2076 (quoting Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Pas-
senger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1017 (9th Cir. 2000)).
155. Id. at 2075.
156. See Williams v. City of Kansas City, 223 F.3d 749, 752, 756 (8th Cir. 2000) (illustrat-
ing that repeated requests to "visit" in supervisor's office as well as several sexual comments
resulted in hostile work environment despite evidentiary errors at trial); Howley v. Town of
Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that several abusive comments
made over the course of a meeting were enough to prevent summaryjudgment of a hostile
environment claim); O'Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1098-99, 1102
(10th Cir. 1999) (illustrating that a supervisor making repeated derogatory generalizations
about women could lead a jury to find sexual harassment); Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 174
F.3d 261, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1999) (using the word "sexy" during threats of termination could
constitute hostile environment harassment); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139,
143-44 (3d Cir. 1999) (demonstrating that undermining, humiliating, and removing sup-
port from a successful female employee because she was a woman constituted a hostile
work environment); Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 852, 860 (1st
Cir. 1998) (firing employee for failing to accompany a client to his motel room); Gallagher
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A. Courts Are Requiring that the Conduct Be Severe and Pervasive
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court said that to determine
whether the conduct has been severe or pervasive, any one of the fol-
lowing factors may be considered: frequency and severity of the con-
duct, "whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance." 5 7 Many courts, however, are requir-
ing that the conduct be severe, frequent, and physically threatening.
In effect, these courts are requiring that the conduct be severe and
pervasive, and some courts also require that the plaintiff show that her
job was tangibly affected. This is contrary to the Court's prior asser-
tion that severe or pervasive discriminatory conduct violated Title VII
broad workplace protections even without considering tangible ef-
fects.1 5 Despite these explicit directives, in virtually all of the follow-
ing decisions the courts have granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the basis that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff
did not allege sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct to constitute
hostile environment sexual harassment.
15 9
1. Courts Are Tolerating Conduct that Would Be Considered Sexual
Assault or Attempted Sexual Assault Under the Criminal Law.-Courts have
properly held that a few off-color jokes, and teasing, especially when
not directed at the plaintiff, do not constitute sexual harassment.
160
Many courts have, however, gone too far in finding that very offensive
conduct-conduct that would amount to sexual assault under crimi-
nal statutes-does not constitute actionable sexual harassment be-
cause it is insufficiently severe or pervasive. In Blough v. Hawkins
Market, Inc., for example, the plaintiffs co-worker patted her on the
v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 343-50 (2d Cir. 1998) (making comments, buying gifts, repeated
requests for dates and subsequent reassignment after employee complaint); Morrison v.
Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 442-43 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining the trial court
could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff had been barred from returning to employ-
ment as the result of gender discrimination).
157. 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 22.
159. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of SummayJudgment in Hostile Environment Cases,
34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 71 (1999) (providing a more thorough discussion of the use of
summary judgment to remove Title VII cases from federal dockets).
160. See, e.g., Terhune v. Frank, No. 2:92-CV-00087, 1993 WL 316006, at *4 (W.D. Mich.
Apr. 23, 1993) (noting that although the aggressor's jokes may have been inappropriate
and annoying to the plaintiff, because the plaintiff did not establish that the jokes were
sexually explicit nor directed toward her, the conduct complained of did not warrant a
finding of hostile environment harassment). See infra notes 313-318 and accompanying
text for a more thorough discussion of the case.
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buttocks.' 6 ' She complained to her supervisor, and, several months
later, the same co-worker grabbed at her crotch. Another co-worker
tried to kiss her and apparently engaged in self-stimulation while the
plaintiff was looking.' 62 The court said that, because the incidents
took place over a nine-month period, they were isolated and insuffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to constitute sexual harassment.
1 63
Similarly, in Hannigan-Haas v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.,' 6 4 the
court said that the following incident was insufficient as a matter of
law to constitute hostile environment sexual harassment because it
was only one act.165 A senior vice president of the company, Good,
asked the plaintiff, Hannigan-Haas, to accompany him to an office.
Once there, Good closed the door and, unbeknownst to
Hannigan-Haas, locked it.... Good then stood up, pushed
Hannigan-Haas against a wall, leaned his chest against hers,
and said "open your mouth" ..... [S]he attempted to avoid
the kiss. Good then attempted to touch Hannigan-Haas'
breasts and to place his hands under Hannigan-Haas'
pantyhose. Hannigan-Haas was able to break away from
Good and run from the room.1
66
The incidents in these two cases would have been sufficiently se-
vere to constitute sexual assault. 167 Nevertheless, the courts in both
cases indicated that the incidents were insufficiently severe or perva-
161. 51 F. Supp. 2d 858, 862 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
162. Id. at 862.
163. Id. at 864. The Model Penal Code defines sexual assault as follows:
A person who has sexual contact with another not his spouse, or causes such
other to have sexual conduct with him, is guilty of sexual assault, a misdemeanor,
if:
(1) he knows that the contact is offensive to the other person....
Sexual contact is any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the
person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 (Official Draft 1962).
164. No. 95 C 7408, 1996 "AL 650419 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 1996).
165. Id. at *5.
166. Id. at *1 (citations omitted).
167. This incident would have been criminal because it would at least have been at-
tempted sexual assault. The Model Penal Code defines attempt as follows:
Definition of attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the
crime, he:
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circumstances as he
believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (Official Draft 1962).
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sive to constitute sexual harassment. Surely the Supreme Court did
not contemplate conduct more serious than sexual assault in order to
pass the "severe" prong of the test. Many of the cases that follow also
involve sexual assault, along with other conduct, but the courts re-
quire that, in addition, the conduct recur to be sufficient to constitute
sexual harassment. 6 ' In other words, many courts require offensive
conduct to be severe and pervasive. For example, in Garcia v. ANR
Freight System, Inc.,'6 9 the plaintiff alleged that during her training pe-
riod, the man who was assigned to train her grabbed the back of her
head, "guid[ed] it toward his lap, ask[ed] to spend the night in the
plaintiffs motel room, and brush [ed] his hand against the plaintiffs
breast. '1 70 The plaintiff left the job after a few months, because of
headaches and general nervousness.1 7 ' The court concluded that the
three incidents were "random, isolated, and brief."' 7 2 The court said
that even if the incidents interfered with her ability to perform the job, it can-
not be said that her terms and conditions of employment had been
altered or that she had been subjected to an abusive working
environment.
73
Crenshaw v. Delray Farms, Inc.' 7 4 presented an even more egre-
gious case that exemplified an atmosphere heavy with discrimination.
The court did not view the situation in that way, but held that the
following conduct was insufficiently severe or pervasive: (1) a co-
worker, Altman, grabbed Crenshaw's left breast; (2) the next week Alt-
man told Crenshaw he needed someone small like her to have sex
with; and (3) soon after, Altman "grabbed and squeezed her buttocks"
and called her an "ignorant ass bitch." After she complained about
these incidents, the supervisor was transferred and the plaintiff was
suspended without pay. 175 Two months later, another co-worker,
Aeyers, "came up behind [the plaintiff], rubbed his penis on her back
and said 'Oh, mamasita."1 76 Two months after this incident, another
168. But see Aden, supra note 47, at 510-12 (contending that one severe act of harass-
ment should be enough). In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the Court said that
hostile environment cases involve a series of acts. 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2073 (2002). Because
the case did not directly interpret the meaning of "severe or pervasive," it is not conclusive
on the issue of whether one act can constitute a hostile environment. See supra Section
I.E.5 and infra Section II.C.1 (discussing Morgan).
169. 942 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
170. Id. at 354.
171. Id. at 355.
172. Id. at 356.
173. Id.
174. 968 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
175. Id. at 1301-02.
176. Id. at 1302.
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co-worker, Porter, asked the plaintiff if she cheated on her husband
and offered her money if she would "be with him." '7 7 Several days
after she reported the incident with Porter, Porter grabbed her and
tried to kiss her. 7' She again reported him, and Porter invaded the
women's bathroom by prying the lock open. 179 He attempted to grab
Crenshaw, who ran away. Porter was reprimanded and stopped
harassing her.t 8' Two months after these incidents, the plaintiff was
told by yet another co-worker "that the pants she was wearing 'made
his groins growl,"' and the plaintiff said that he wanted to take her to
a hotel, "'eat [her] out' and 'do all types of tricks with [her].' "181 The
court found that because the offending conduct was not persistent, it
did not constitute a hostile work environment in violation of Title
VII 1 2 It is difficult to imagine how much more pervasive the offen-
sive conduct could have been. The Crenshaw court must have been
comprehending a meaning for "persistent" that is beyond pervasive.
Crenshaw clearly illustrates an atmosphere "permeated with 'discrimi-
natory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.' "183
The problem with the analyses of the courts cited in this section,
is that, although each court purported to have assessed the decision
according to the guidelines of Harris, the authority cited for the deci-
sion was in fact other lower court cases that misapplied the Harris stan-
dard. For example, in Robbins v. South Bend Public Transportation
Corp.,184 the court discussed the severe or pervasive standard at length.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1303.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1306. For other cases with similarly egregious fact scenarios, but where the
courts did not find actionable conduct, see Grigaliunas v. Rockwell International Corp., No.
3:98CV7351, 1999 WL 681509 (N.D. Ohio July 6, 1999); Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Acree
Italiane, No. 95 CV 02021 (SAS), 1997 WL 642556 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1997); Houck v. City of
Prairie Village, 977 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Kan. 1997), affd, 166 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1998);
Guidry v. Zale Corp., 969 F. Supp. 988 (M.D. La. 1997).
183. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B.
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
Even persistent conduct was insufficient in Baker v. Starwood Hotel and Resort Worldwide,
Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-2076, 1999 WL 397405 (E.D. La. June 15, 1999). In that case, the
plaintiff alleged that her supervisor made "unsolicited sexual advances that continued daily
until the date of her termination approximately one month later." Baker, 1999 WL 397405,
at *1. The inference was that this was sufficiently severe or pervasive, but even so, the court
found the defendant to be not liable. Id. at *4.
184. No. 3:95-CV-541RP, 1996 WL 698023 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 3, 1996). The author uses
several unreported cases such as this one to illustrate the point that courts do not take
sexual harassment very seriously. The fact that some of the most egregious cases of harass-
ment are unreported illustrates how lightly the courts treat these cases.
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The court reached the decision that the conduct alleged was not suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive by citing circuit precedent.185 Some cases
the court relied on exemplified reasonable conclusions of what was
not severe or pervasive, such as "a handful of general comments over
two years," '186 or "one off color joke and a conversation about a strip
bar not directed at the employee." '87 However, the court also cited
more questionable holdings, such as "incidents of unwanted touching,
attempted kissing, and placing 'I love you' signs in the work area and
asking for dates did not create a hostile work environment,"188 and an
"incident where [her] temporary supervisor called plaintiff a 'whore'
and 'bitch,' grabbed her from behind, and shoved her against a soft
drink machine [that] did not constitute sexual harassment." '89 The
mistake this court and others make is requiring the conduct to be as
egregious as the worst cases presented to the courts. As the Supreme
Court explained in Harris, harassing behavior need not be psychologi-
cally injurious to be actionable under Title VII. 19 0 If the Robbins court
was genuinely assessing whether a reasonable person would perceive
the conduct as hostile or abusive, the alleged conduct would clearly be
sufficiently severe or pervasive. Rather than applying a res ipsa lo-
quiter standard, however, some courts require that, in addition to
proving that the conduct was severe and/or pervasive, the conduct
must tangibly affect the plaintiff s job performance, as well.
2. Some Courts Require Proof that the Conduct Tangibly Affected the
Plaintiffs Job Performance.-In Kenyon v. Western Extrusions Corp., 91 the
185. Id. at *4-5.
186. Id at *5 (citing Kantar v. Baldwin Cooke Co., No. 93C 6239, 1995 WL 692022, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 1995)).
187. Id. (citing Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1993)).
188. Id. (citing Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993)).
189. Id. (citing Ripberger v. Western Ohio Pizza, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D. Ind.
1995)). The court noted that it was considering the factors enunciated in Harris-fre-
quency, severity, physical contact or mere offensive speech, and interference with work
performance. Id. The court also said that it was evaluating the conduct from both the
objective and subjective perspectives. Id The court explained the fuzzy line between ob-
jective sexual harassment and mere offensive conduct in this way:
On one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether amorous or hos-
tile, for which there is no consent express or implied; uninvited sexual solicita-
tions, intimidating words or acts; obscene language or gestures; pornographic
pictures. On the other side lies the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual
innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers.
Id. at *6 (quoting Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1995))
(internal citations omitted). In assessing precedent, the court looked at conduct that con-
stituted sexual harassment. Id.
190. 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
191. No. Civ. A. 3:98CV2431L, 2000 WL 12902 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2000).
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plaintiff contended that her supervisor, Weable, sexually harassed her
by rubbing his genitals on her, staring at her breasts, and touching
various parts of her body in a sexual manner.192 On another occasion,
Weable asked her if she was wearing panties. 193 At another time, he
told her to "'hike up [her] dress.'"194 In all, the plaintiff alleged fifty
instances of harassment.1 95 The court said that, although the conduct
was sufficiently severe or pervasive, she failed to show in addition that
the conduct "undermined her worlplace competence." '96
Similarly, in McGraw v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Inc.,197 the court
said that the plaintiff, McGraw, did not show that she was subjected to
pervasive harassment. Indeed, courts have required a plaintiff to show
that she has been "subjected to continued explicit propositions or sex-
ual epithets or persistent offensive touchings."198 The plaintiff alleged
that her supervisor, Maggio, forced her to kiss him once and asked
her out constantly until she announced her engagement, at which
point Maggio told her that she should have gone out with him. 9 9 Af-
ter that, the plaintiff alleged that Maggio retaliated against her and on
one occasion screamed at her.200 The court decided that McGraw
failed to demonstrate that Maggio's behavior was persistent enough to
change the terms and conditions of her work.0 1 Furthermore, the
court explained that McGraw never alleged that Maggio's behavior in-
terfered with her job performance.20 2
Finally in a particularly strict interpretation, or misinterpretation,
of the Harris factors, Mendoza v. Borden, Inc.,20 3 the Eleventh Circuit
192. Id. at *4.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at *6.
196. Id.
197. No. Civ. A. 96-5780, 1997 WL 799437 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997).
198. Id. at *5 (citations omitted). The court said that the incidents alleged by the plain-
tiff were insufficient to meet this standard, in part, because she did not tie them down
specifically to time and frequency. Id. at *6. However, in the court's own recitation of the
facts, it was clear that in the relevant time period, the plaintiff, McGraw, alleged that her
supervisor, Maggio, repeatedly asked her out. Id. at *1. Maggio also inappropriately
touched her, kissed her without her consent, and continued to ask her for dates. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *2.
201. Id. at *6.
202. Id. McGraw filed a complaint with the human resources department alleging sex-
ual harassment. Id. at *2. The department found the complaint to be unsubstantiated,
and a few months later, McGraw was fired for poor work performance. The court granted
summaryjudgment on hostile environment discrimination, but denied the summary judg-
ment on quid pro quo harassment because it was possible that her supervisor was retali-
ating against her for complaining about him. Id. at *6-8.
203. 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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sitting en banc affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant on the basis that, as a matter of law, the conduct alleged
was insufficiently severe or pervasive.2 °4 The plaintiff alleged that
Page, who had supervisory authority over her and was the highest
ranking employee in the facility, constantly watched her and followed
her around.2 °5 The plaintiff also testified that there were two in-
stances in which he "looked [her] up and down, and stopped at [her]
groin area and made a ... sniffing motion."20 6 Page never made any
physical contact with her except on one occasion when he "rubbed his
right hip up against [her] left hip while touching her shoulder and
smiling."27
The court said that three out of the four factors of Harris were
missing.2° First, the plaintiff failed to show that the conduct physi-
cally threatened or humiliated her or that his conduct interfered with
her ability to do her job.2 °9 Second, the conduct was not sufficiently
severe.210 Finally, the court said that, other than being followed and
stared at, the conduct was not frequent. 21' Because the plaintiff did
not allege that the supervisor was "stalking, leering, intimidating, or
threatening, '" 21 2 the court said it did not want to set a baseline for
sexual harassment that would trivialize it and cited several cases of
more severe conduct.21 3
In Harris, the Court made it clear that "no single factor is re-
quired" to demonstrate hostile environment harassment. 2 4 Neverthe-
less, some courts require that all of the factors be met in order to
avoid summary judgment; many more require that most of the factors
be met.215
204. Id. at 1252-53.
205. Id. at 1242.
206. Id. at 1243 (internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. Id. at 1248.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1249.
211. Id.
212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id. at 1252-53 n.10.
214. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
215. In addition, at least one court has alluded to another factor in addition to the
Harris factors that also must be met. Hines v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 96 C 4889, 1999
WL 1267697, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1999) (requiring the plaintiff to complain about the
conduct in order to demonstrate a subjective perception of hostility within the work envi-
ronment). See infra notes 217-220 (considering Hines in greater detail).
Another tactic some courts employ to limit the evidence of hostile environment is
exemplified by Guidry v. Zale Corp., in which the court decided that because the allegedly
harassing incidents were not spelled out in the plaintiffs EEOC charge, the events could
2003]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Applying the Hanis factors too strictly is only one method the
courts use to avoid a trial on the merits in sexual harassment cases. In
Harris, the Court said that two determinations had to be made: the
conduct had to be offensive to a reasonable person and also had to be
subjectively offensive to the plaintiff.216 At least one court has used
the plaintiffs failure to complain about the conduct to show that it
was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to be subjectively offensive.217
In Hines v. Sherwin Williams Co., the court used the plaintiffs fail-
ure to complain to demonstrate that the conduct was not subjectively
offensive, despite the fact that she told a supervisor about the harass-
ment after the supervisor approached her about it. The harassment
resumed, but the plaintiff failed to complain because she was fearful
that the consequence of naming her harasser would exacerbate her
situation, or even that she might be killed.218 The court said that the
behavior was objectively serious enough to constitute sexual harass-
ment, but it evidently did not bother her enough to complain about
it.219 The court made this decision despite the fact that the plaintiff
not reasonably be expected to grow out of plaintiff's allegations of being harassed during a
later time period. 969 F. Supp. 988, 990-91 (M.D. La. 1997).
216. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
217. See Hines, 1999 WL 1267697. The court in Hines granted summary judgment for
the defendant because the plaintiff had not complained. Hines, the only female in the
department, alleged that she was sexually harassed throughout her employment by her co-
workers starting in September 1992. Id. at *2. After a manager approached the plaintiff
and discussed the initial incidents, the conduct stopped temporarily. Id. One month later,
her co-workers started harassing her and continued the harassment for over a year. Id. at
*2-3. She alleged the following:
[a co-worker] grabbed her on almost a daily basis and tried to kiss her perhaps
once a week. Pruitt and Ferrer [other employees] also "ganged up on" Hines
[the plaintiff] three or four times, with Ferrer holding Hines while Pruitt tried to
kiss her .. . [Other coworkers] rubbed her from behind and addressed certain
statements of a sexual nature to her. Hines also claims she was threatened by Hill
once, found a sexually explicit drawing of which she was the subject once, and was
slapped on the buttocks by Ferrer once.
Id. at *2 (citations omitted). She did not report the incidents because she was afraid that
she would be killed if someone got fired. Id. at *3. She started experiencing health
problems that she believed were related to the harassment and finally resigned. Id. at *34.
In Ellerth, the Supreme Court said that the plaintiffs unreasonable failure to complain
can be an affirmative defense for the employer to avoid liability when no tangible employ-
ment action is taken. 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). However, as applied here, the defense
puts the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that her failure to complain was not
unreasonable as part of the proof that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive.
Hines, 1999 WL 1267697, at *3.
218. Hines, 1999 WL 1267697, at *3. The plant manager learned about the harassment
after he asked the plaintiff why she left early the day before. Id. at *2.
219. Id. at *6.
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presented uncontested evidence that she had complained once, the
harassment did not stop, and she was too afraid to complain again.22 °
The ultimate question, as Justice Ginsburg suggested in her con-
currence to Harris, should be whether a reasonable person would find
it more difficult to do the job or,22 ' as the majority said in Harris,
whether a reasonable person would believe that the environment was
abusive. 222 There is absolutely no question that in cases such as Rob-
bins, McGraw, and Mendoza, both standards were met. Many courts,
however, require victims of sexual harassment to submit to outrageous
behavior that would not be tolerated in any other context. Although
the standard is purportedly the same, the courts treat victims of racial
harassment much more reasonably.
B. Courts Tolerate Conduct in Sexual Harassment Cases that Would Not
Be Tolerated in Racial Harassment Cases223
When courts are faced with cases of racial harassment, they artic-
ulate the standard set out in Harris;22 4 however, the threshold for se-
vere or pervasive conduct in racial harassment cases is frequently
much lower.22 5 For example, in Baxter v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,22 6
a case of racial harassment, the court refused to grant summary judg-
ment for the defendant on the issue of hostile work environment. 227
The plaintiff alleged the following three incidents, none of which was
directed at her: (1) A supervisor called one of her co-workers, a native
of Trinidad, as "a crazy island girl";221 (2) at another time, the same
supervisor said that African-Americans like to eat watermelon; and (3)
he allegedly "made derogatory comments about an African-American
220. Id. The fact that issues of material fact are clearly present in many of these cases is
beyond the scope of this Article, but that was the case in Hines and in many of the cases
cited in this section. See Beiner, supra note 159 (discussing the misuse of summary judg-
ment in sexual harassment cases).
221. Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
222. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
223. Cases of ethnic harassment have been included as well. Racial and ethnic
harassment are generally treated the same. See, e.g., Chaboya v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 72 F.
Supp. 2d 1081, 1082, 1091 (D. Ariz. 1999) (referring to Hispanic employee's alleged
harassment as racial harassment).
224. The Court recently cited the severe or pervasive standard as the standard in a racial
harassment case under Title VII. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061,
2074 (2002). See supra Section I.E.5 and infra Section II.C.1 for a discussion of the case.
225. See Gregory, supra note 25 (comparing standards for racial and sexual harassment
in more detail). But see H~bert, Analogizing Race, supra note 23 (explaining why different
standards should exist for racial and sexual harassment).
226. No. 94-02738SS, 1996 W'L 684448 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 1996).
227. Id. at *4.
228. Id. at *3.
2003] 119
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
employee's 'afro' hairstyle, asking whether 'bugs fly in [her] hair.' "229
None of these incidents was reported. 230 If this case were re-cast as a
sexual harassment case, it would receive short shrift from the courts
that decided the cases described in the preceding sections.
In another case of racial harassment, Qualls v. Radix Group Inter-
national, Inc.,2 31 the court found the conduct of the plaintiffs supervi-
sor calling her a "nigger [to be] severely offensive." 232 The court
noted that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit finds the word
"nigger" unquestionably racist and that use of the term, even a few
times, sufficiently affects the terms and conditions of employment to
support a hostile work environment claim.23
When the same circuit dealt with an analogously offensive term
for women, however, the outcome was quite different. In Galloway v.
General Motors Service Parts Operations,23 14 the plaintiff was repeatedly
called a "bitch."23 5 The court said:
the word "bitch" does not necessarily connote some specific
female characteristic, whether true, false, or stereotypical; it
does not draw attention to the woman's sexual or maternal
characteristics or other respects in which women might be
thought to be inferior to men in the workplace, or unworthy
of equal dignity and respect. In its normal usage, it is simply
a pejorative term for "woman."236
The court said that one use of the word "bitch" would certainly not be
sexual harassment; moreover, the use of the term repeated daily for a
period of years would not necessarily constitute sexual harassment.23 7
In other words, in the Seventh Circuit, using the term "bitch" con-
stantly towards a woman may not be sufficient to form the basis of a
Title VII claim, but the occasional use of the word "nigger" to an Afri-
can-American would be sufficient.
Similarly, in Chaboya v. American National Red Cross,23 8 the plain-
tiffs co-worker had "verbally accosted and physically threatened" the
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. No. 98 C 2695, 1999 WL 1267716 (N.D. II. Nov. 17, 1999).
232. Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
233. Id. (citing Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993)).
234. 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996), overruled in part by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Mor-
gan, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002). See infra note 270 (discussing Galloway); Gregory, supra note
25, at 756-72 (comparing the Rogers and Galloway decisions).
235. 78 F.3d at 1168.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1167-68.
238. 72 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Ariz. 1999).
[VOL. 62:85
LICENSE TO HARASS WOMEN
plaintiff, calling him names such as "'spic,' 'dumb Mexican' and
'dumb-ass Mexican.' 239 A defaced photograph of the plaintiff and a
co-worker was posted on the bulletin board and captioned "'racist
fagot' and 'but why does he like white women.' "240 In a bench trial,
the court said that this was sufficient to constitute racial
harassment.241
Chaboya can be compared to Grayson v. Linnco Futures Group,2 4 2 in
which the plaintiff referred to more than sixty incidents of sexual har-
assment, covering a period of two-and-one-half years.243 Many of the
incidents involved derogatory comments made by a floor manager,
who did not have supervisory authority over the plaintiff.24" The
plaintiff complained to her supervisor.245 The floor manager called
her a "tramp," a "whore" a "bitch" and a "fat ass."' 2 4 6 On several occa-
sions, he made lewd comments about the physical attributes of wo-
men. In addition, he made insulting or threatening comments
concerning the plaintiffs daughter. He also threw objects at the
plaintiff and made other rude remarks to her. The plaintiff was too
upset to work on more than one occasion because of the manager's
behavior.247 She was finally discharged for excessive absenteeism or
abandonment of employment. 248 The court said that the incidents
were insufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute sexual
harassment.249
In a final case of racial harassment, Reid v. O'Leary,251 the plaintiff
found in her desk "a framed certificate with her name printed on it,
entitled Temporary Coon Ass Certificate. ' 251 The certificate was
signed by a white employee and was given to at least four other em-
ployees, two of whom were white.252 The certificate further said "You
239. Id. at 1083.
240. Id. at 1084.
241. Id. at 1091.
242. No. 97 C 8485, 1999 WL 89553 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1999).
243. Id. at *3.
244. Id. at *5.
245. Id. at *4.
246. Id. at *3.
247. Id.
248. Id. at *4.
249. Id. at *5. For other situations of sexual harassment that were analogous to the
racial harassment in Chaboya, but in which the courts determined the conduct was not
sufficient to constitute a hostile environment, see Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d
333 (7th Cir. 1993); Sechrist v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, No. Civ. A. 98-
2219-KHV, 1999 WL 450947, at *4 (D. Kan. June 22, 1999).
250. No. Civ. A. 96-401, 1996 WL 411494 (D.D.C. July 15, 1996).




are to learn to sing, dance and tell jokes and eat boudin, cracklins,
gumbo, crawfish etouffee and just about everything else. '25 ' The
white employee later explained in a letter of apology that the term
'Coon-Ass' is a slang expression meaning Cajun as ethnic to south
Louisiana and has nothing to do with race.254 The court, however,
denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, deciding that
it was a triable issue whether "the alleged conduct [was] unreasonably
abusive or offensive in the workplace environment or adversely af-
fected the reasonable employee's ability to function in his or her
job. '2 55 The court also acknowledged that although a single incident
alone does not necessarily create a hostile work environment, the
term 'Coon-Ass' may be on its own racially derogatory or sufficiently
severe to form a hostile work environment. 256
These cases illustrate the phenomenon that, although courts give
lip service to the requirement that racial harassment be severe or per-
vasive before it is actionable, the standard is, in fact, applied less strin-
gently than some courts apply the standard to sexual harassment. If
any of the sexual harassment cases cited so far were re-cast as racial
harassment, it would become clear that the plaintiffs in all of these
cases were subjected to less favorable terms and conditions of
employment.
The standard as it was applied to these racial harassment cases is
the correct standard. The conduct in the cases cited above was suffi-
cient to offend a reasonable person and make his job more difficult.
That is all that should be required, rather than the egregious conduct
253. Id
254. Id. at *2.
255. Id. at *3. In yet another case of racial harassment, Roberts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
the court found the following sufficient to survive summary judgment, when added to
other allegations of disparate treatment (discriminatory discipline, for example): the plain-
tiff allegedly overheard two co-workers using the term "nigger," not directed at him. No.
95-0059-H, 1996 WL 403790, at *1 (W.D. Va.July 1, 1996). In addition, "another co-worker
told the plaintiff 'all you black guys think somebody is scared of you.'" Id. A store man-
ager opined that "all blacks bring discrimination charges." Id. Finally, the plaintiff con-
tended that white employees thought he was lazy and refused to work with him. Id.
See also Curtis v. Airborne Freight Corp., No. Civ. 40621 (SAS), 1998 WL 883297, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1998) (denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment despite
plaintiffs' complaints about two comments made by a supervisor); Schwapp v. Town of
Avon, 118 F. 3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing the lower court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant based on the plaintiff police officer's allegations that a co-
worker said that a "nigger bitch" was beating her children; another co-worker asked why
the players did a "jungle dance" when they scored; a superior officer gave the plaintiff a
copy of a racially offensive joke featuring the word "nigger"; and a superior officer said that
the plaintiff should not expect his fellow officers to be as courteous to him as he was to
them and that he should not be so sensitive).
256. Reid, 1996 WL 411494, at *4.
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required in the sexual harassment cases. The only rational difference
between racial and sexual harassment is that some sexual advances
may be welcome, while racial harassment would never be welcome. 257
Once the determination is made that the harassment is unwelcome,
there is no reason to apply a different standard to sexual harassment
cases. Some courts, not content with adopting an unconscionably
high threshold for sexual harassment to be actionable, have devel-
oped other similarly inappropriately applied mechanisms that limit ev-
idence of what is severe or pervasive.
C. Courts Parse the Evidence to Avoid a Finding of Severe or
Pervasive Sexual Harassment
In addition to finding that harassing conduct was sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive, courts ignore other evidence of harassment and re-
fuse to consider evidence of conduct that occurred before the
employer took remedial action, even when the remedial action did
not end the harassment. Furthermore, until recently, some courts
limited the evidence that could be presented by refusing to apply the
continuing violation theory in sexual harassment cases.
1. Refusing to Apply the Continuing Violation Theoy.-Recently, in
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, a race-based harassment
case, the Court decided that the continuing violation theory applies to
hostile environment harassment cases.25 Prior to this time, some
courts refused to allow the plaintiff to use the continuing violation
theory to establish sexual harassment and limited actionable incidents
to the 180-300 days before the charge was filed.2 59 Obviously, as ex-
emplified by the Morgan case, the courts also were refusing to apply
the continuing violation theory in racial harassment cases. However,
because many courts require more serious continuing conduct in sex-
ual harassment cases, as discussed in the previous section, failure to
apply the continuing violation theory impacted sexual harassment
cases more adversely.
The continuing violation theory posits that some acts of discrimi-
nation have discriminatory effects that extend the statute of limita-
tions as long as the discriminatory effects last, so that the violation
257. See H1bert, Analogizing Race, supra note 23, at 824, 848.
258. 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2077 (2002). See supra Section I.E.5 and infra Section II.C.1 for a
further discussion of this case.
259. See, e.g., Alvey v. Rayovac Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1315, 1327 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (limiting
plaintiff's suit to conduct that occurred within 300 days of filing a charge). Title VII re-
quires a charge to be filed within 180 days of the occurrence of discrimination or within
300 days if the state has a deferral agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000).
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"continues" until the discriminatory effects cease. 260 The courts have
recognized the continuing violation theory in limited situations, how-
ever.2 6 1 For example, in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,26 2 the plaintiff
was an airline stewardess fired for violating the airline's policy that
stewardesses could not be married.263 She did not file a timely charge
of discrimination. 264 The no-marriage rule was later changed by a col-
lective bargaining agreement by which the plaintiff was not cov-
ered.265 Thereafter, the plaintiff sought reinstatement and was re-
hired but not given the seniority she would have had but for the dis-
charge. The Court held that the original violation-the discharge-
was not a continuing violation, even though the past discrimination
had present effects-less seniority.266
These types of cases are not comparable to sexual harassment
cases, where the conduct must occur over a period of time in order to
support a determination that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive.267
Nevertheless, many lower courts were refusing to allow evidence of
sexual harassment that occurred before the period covered by the stat-
ute of limitations. 61 It should be noted that the statute of limitations
under Title VII is very short, 180 days in jurisdictions that do not have
260. See, e.g., Dudley v. Metro-Dade County, 989 F. Supp. 1192, 1198 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(defining continuing violation exception as applying when there is evidence of ongoing
discrimination continuing as unremedied so that it amounts to a practice or policy).
261. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 22, at 448-49 (recognizing that courts may
apply the continuing violation theory when the discriminatory conduct is part of a policy
that continues into the limiting period, the date of discrimination is difficult to pinpoint,
or when seemingly benign acts are later discovered to be cumulatively discriminatory).
262. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
263. Id. at 554.
264. Id. at 554-55.
265. Id. at 555.
266. Id. at 558.
267. In Meritor, the plaintiff complained about sexual harassment that started in 1974
and ended after 1977. 477 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1986). She was fired for excessive leave in
November 1978. Id. at 60. She had never reported any of the incidents because she was
afraid of the perpetrator. Id. at 61. Whether this was a continuing violation was not at
issue, but the Court obviously assumed that all of the incidents were relevant to the issue of
harassment.
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the president of the company harassed the plaintiff
throughout her employment beginning in April 1985, and ending in October 1987. 510
U.S. 17, 19 (1993). The president insulted her "because of her gender and often made her
the target of unwanted sexual innuendos." Id. The question was whether the standard for
severe or pervasive, which the lower court articulated, was correct-that the conduct must
be sufficient to seriously affect the plaintiffs psychological well-being. Id. at 20. As in
Meritor, the Court apparently assumed that all of the incidents were relevant to that
determination.
268. See, e.g., Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th
Cir. 1996) (reversing a lower court's decision to establish a cutoff date), overruled in part by
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002).
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a state deferral agency or 300 days in states that do.269 These courts
were inappropriately basing their decisions on Title VII law that de-
fined a continuing violation in cases in which there were discrete vio-
lations that had subsequent consequences. 270
For example, in Vargas-Harrison v. Waukegan Community Unit
School District #60,271 the plaintiff complained that her supervisor, Ali,
had asked her out for drinks, made comments about her lips, tried to
kiss her, and told her "he thought Hispanic women were 'hot sexu-
ally.'- 27 2 In addition, he "would look at her in a 'sexual way' by look-
ing her up and down or looking at her breasts. '27" He also "tried to
touch her vagina and buttocks, hugged her from behind, and pulled
her close for a kiss[,] and ... repeatedly attempted to kiss her, make
sexual advances towards her, and ask her out for dates. '27 4 The court
said that the plaintiff's problem was that only five of the twenty-seven
alleged instances of sexual harassment occurred within 300 days
before the charge was filed, such as the sexual assault that had oc-
curred six months before the limitations date.275 The court failed to
269. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1) (2000).
270. The problem is fully discussed in Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations,
in which the court applied the continuing violation theory properly, and provided some
guidelines in dicta. Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1166-68. In Galloway, the plaintiff previously had a
romantic relationship with a co-worker, Bullock. The relationship ended in 1987, after
which Bullock repeatedly called Galloway a "sick bitch." Id. In addition, on one occasion,
Bullock made an obscene gesture and said "'suck this, bitch.'" The lower court excluded
evidence of all incidents that occurred more than 300 days before the plaintiff filed her
charge. Id. at 1166-67. The appellate court disagreed, recognizing that sexual harassment
is a cumulative process and may not have gone on long enough to be considered severe or
pervasive. The court articulated respective guidelines that were ultimately rejected by the
Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan. 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2074 n.ll
(2002).
The court, however, agreed with the lower court that the use of the term "sick bitch"
was not a sex or gender-related term. Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1167-68. Bullock's use of the
term was motivated by personal dislike unrelated to gender. Id. at 1168. The court was, of
course, ignoring the fact that the origin of the dislike was an affair that had soured, a
classic situation for sexual harassment. Id. at 1165. In addition, it is pure sophistry to
refuse to connect the term "bitch" to discrimination against women. In this case, the plain-
tiff was allowed to bring suit based on the continuing violation theory. Id.
271. No. 97 C 1071, 1998 VAWL 831837 (N.D. Il. Nov. 25, 1998).
272. Id. at *1.
273. Id.
274. Id. at *1-2.
275. Id. at *6. The court said that the only claims that were timely were claims that he
had asked her out for drinks on two occasions and that he said on another occasion he was
still waiting for a kiss." Id. At another time, he made a remark about her hair and eyes
and said that "there was 'still time for us to get together."' Id. Finally, on another occa-
sion, he told her she "looked great and they should go out." Id. The court said that the
events that occurred within the statute were not sufficiently severe or pervasive and that the
continuing violation theory did not apply. Id. The court said that the plaintiff should have
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take into account that the plaintiff complained constantly about the
harassment and could have reasonably believed that it had been or
would be alleviated.176 Taking this view of the continuing violation
theory put too much pressure on plaintiffs to make an early assess-
ment of what constitutes actionable harassment and that complaining
to the employer will not remedy it.
2 77
Similarly, in Dudley v. Metro-Dade County,27 the court refused to
allow evidence of harassment that occurred outside of the statute of
limitations although it was perpetrated by a management official.
279
The harassment stopped and started again several times, but extended
throughout the plaintiff's employment.2"' In 1985 when the plaintiff,
Dudley, was hired, her supervisor, Hood, made her uncomfortable by
asking her for dates, telling her he missed her when he was out of the
office, was thinking of her and could not wait to see her.2"' In 1987,
Hood allegedly "exposed his penis to Dudley," and said "Girl, you just
don't know what you do to me. You don't know what you are miss-
ing.'"282 She complained to the company of this incident. The com-
pany took no action, but Hood desisted for two years, until 1990,
when Hood started asking her out again.28 3 He also "would come to
her office and 'bounce[ ] his genital area' against her. '284 He showed
up unexpectedly at her house on one occasion, "constantly asked her
out for dates, and he sometimes touched her."28 5 She confronted
Hood, as did another co-worker Hood had allegedly harassed. After
this confrontation, which took place in 1993, Hood did not speak to
Dudley unless necessary for business. In 1994, the harassment began
again."' Hood told Dudley she "'was the one he wanted,"' and that
known that Ali's conduct was not such that it could only "be recognized as actionable
harassment only in light of the events that occurred" within the statute of limitations. Be-
cause the conduct was much worse before the statute ran, the court said, subsequent events
could not have constituted or been recognized as actionable harassment only in light of
the subsequent events. Id.
276. Id.
277. The Vargas-Harrison approach to the continuing violating theory was further exac-
erbated by the Court's decision in Clark County School District v. Breeden, in which the Court
said that if the jury would find the plaintiff to be unreasonable in her belief that she has
been subjected to sexual harassment, she has no claim for retaliation if she is disciplined
for complaining. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
278. 989 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
279. Id. at 1198-99.
280. Id. at 1199.
281. Id. at 1195.
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he "'just [couldn't] shake the way' he felt" about her and that he
wanted to go out with her.287 Among other things, he "'tried to ca-
ress' her hand. ' 288 She threatened to report him if he ever touched
her again. Shortly after this incident, Hood told Dudley that she
would "'see what wicked is." 289 Two weeks later, he gave her a bad
evaluation. The court considered evidence only of the incidents that
occurred in 1994 and said that they were insufficient to establish a
hostile environment. 290
The court said that she should have complained about the earlier
violations.291 In fact, she either did complain or thought the situation
was remedied. 92 It was only after the third resumption of the harass-
ment and the retaliatory evaluation that she finally filed suit. The
court said there was an insufficient nexus between the time-barred
claims and the current claims, although the same harasser was in-
volved.293 The court noted the long intervals between incidents and
concluded that the violations were not temporally related.294 It ap-
pears that the plaintiff acted very reasonably, but was punished by the
court for doing so.
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,295 the Supreme
Court put an end to the courts' ability to limit evidence, and indeed
liability, for a course of conduct that constitutes a hostile environ-
ment.29 6 The Court used none of the tests relied on by the lower
287. Id. at 1195-96.
288. Id. at 1196.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1200. The court said the test for whether the alleged harassment was a con-
tinuing violation was whether "the claims are related in subject matter and frequency and
whether the alleged violations were permanent in the sense that they served to trigger the
employee's awareness that her civil rights had been violated." Id. at 1198.
291. Id. at 1199.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. In another case involving a single perpetrator, LaRose v. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc., the conduct complained of began in 1983 and continued for 13 years. 21 F. Supp. 2d
492, 494-95 (E.D. Pa. 1998), affd mem., 205 F.3d 1329 (3d Cir. 1999). The most serious
incident occurred in 1983 when Schrager came up behind the plaintiff, "groped her
breasts, and made grinding, 'humping' motions behind her." Id. at 495. When the plain-
tiff complained to the union about Schrager's behavior, he called her a "'lying bitch'" and
had to be restrained. Id. The plaintiff took sick leave because of emotional stress in 1996
because of the harassment by Schrager. Id. at 496-97. The court said that much of
Schrager's conduct occurred in the mid-1980s, and the plaintiff should have known that
her rights were violated and sued at that time. Id. at 499. With regard to the events that
occurred after the statutory period-Schrager's following the plaintiff, standing too close
to her and treating her less favorably in work matters-the court said they were insufficient
to constitute a hostile environment. Id. at 500.
295. 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002). See supra Section I.E.5 for a further discussion of the case.
296. Id. at 2077.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
courts to determine whether incidents that allegedly constitute a part
of a hostile environment would be actionable; rather, it simply said
that all such. incidents are part of a continuing violation.29 7
One point that the Supreme Court did not make in Morgan was
that the courts themselves have difficulty deciding whether conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile environment. If
courts, which are knowledgeable in the law, have difficulty making the
determination of the point at which harassment becomes actionable,
it is absurd to require the plaintiff to do so. Furthermore, the lower
courts have also ignored the difficulty plaintiffs have in reporting the
incidents in the first place. Even Ellerth recognized that there are rea-
sons why employees do not promptly complain and provided an ex-
ception. 298 In Hines v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,299 discussed earlier, after
the plaintiff had complained, the harassing behavior escalated, and
she contended she was afraid that she would be killed if she com-
plained again and got someone fired.30 0 The court refused to apply
the continuing violation theory and denied the motion for summary
judgment.30 ' Even if employees do report the conduct, often the
court's answer is that there is insufficient evidence.30 2 The harass-
ment continues, and the plaintiffs are often discharged for poor work
performance, either because the supervisor is retaliating against
them 30 3 or because the harassment has adversely affected their work
performance.30 4 With Ellerth's requirement that employees must not
297. Id. at 2073. For a discussion of the limitations of the continuing violation theory,
see supra notes 149-155 and accompanying text.
298. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). The employer must
prove that the employee unreasonably failed to complain. Id. As the Court said in Faragher
v. Boca Raton,
[an employer may, for example, have provided a proven, effective mechanism
for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, available to the em-
ployee without undue risk or expense. If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail
herself of the employer's preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not re-
cover damages that could have been avoided if she had done so.
524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998) (emphasis added).
299. No. 96 C 4889, 1999 WL 1267697 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1999).
300. Id. at *3; see supra notes 217-220 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of
Hines).
301. Hines, 1999 WAL 1267697, at *5.
302. See, e.g., Polimeni v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CV 92 5702 (RJD), 1996 WL 743351
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1996) (finding three isolated incidents of harassment over two years to
be insufficient to constitute hostile environment harassment).
303. See, e.g., McGraw v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-5780, 1997 WL 799437
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997) (denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment because
of the possibility that the supervisor was retaliating against the plaintiff for complaining).
304. Estrich, supra note 25, at 834.
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unreasonably fail to complain to the employer,3 0 5 plaintiffs already
had a very limited window of opportunity to pursue their claims with-
out having to be concerned with the short statute of limitations. How-
ever, the Court in Morgan noted that the statute of limitations should
never have entered into the determination of whether the conduct is
actionable as long as the harassment continues into the statutory
period. °6
The cases in this section illustrate the extent to which courts were
going to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant, despite
very serious allegations of sexual harassment.30 7 While the Supreme
Court has substantially removed the ability of courts to limit evidence
of hostile environment harassment because of the statute of limita-
tions, the lower courts employ other tactics to limit claims.
2. Other Tactics the Courts Use to Prevent the Plaintiff from Establish-
ing that the Harassment Was Severe or Pervasive.-If the plaintiff com-
plains, and the supervisor takes action against her in retaliation, the
retaliation itself is part of the sexual harassment and should be consid-
ered with the other evidence to determine whether the conduct was
severe or pervasive. 08 Instead, many courts treat the evidence of re-
taliation separately, which makes it more likely that the courts can
avoid a finding that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to
go to the jury.
305. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1988).
306. 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2075-77 (2002). The Court noted that states that have their own
remedial schemes have a 300-day limitation, while states that do not have a 180-day limita-
tion, and said "we cannot import such a limiting principle into the provision where its
effect would be to make the reviewable time period for liability dependent upon whether
an employee lives in a State that has its own remedial scheme." Id. at 2076.
While the Court did not acknowledge the reluctance of some courts to admit evidence
of acts outside the limitations period as background to determine whether the severe or
pervasive requirement has been met, the Court did note that the statute does not prohibit
evidence of related acts as background. Id. at 2072.
307. For example, in Polimeni v. American Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff was a flight attend-
ant. She had to work on occasion with a man, Villareal, whom she claimed sexually
harassed her. No. CV92 5702 (RJD), 1996WL 743351, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec, 18, 1996). He
"told me I need to be fucked and touched while he shook me by the arm" and later
brushed against her breast. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). She complained. Ten
months later, Villareal pulled her behind a curtain and asked if she was still afraid of him,
called her a bitch and blew in her hair. She complained again. Villareal was counseled
about encountering the plaintiff in the future. Id. The next year, Villareal walked by the
plaintiff and struck her in the buttocks with his bag. Id. at *2. The court granted the
defendant's motion for summaryjudgment based on the fact that the incidents were few in
number and were "relatively minor." Id. Furthermore, they were spread over two years,
and she had limited contact with Villareal. The court concluded that no reasonable per-
son would find a hostile environment. Id.
308. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2000).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
For example, in McGraw v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Inc., the court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue
of hostile environment harassment, but denied summary judgment on
the issue of quid pro quo harassment because it was possible that the
plaintiffs supervisor, Maggio, was retaliating against her for com-
plaining about him.30 9 The court decided that the plaintiff failed to
show that Maggio's conduct was sufficiently "pervasive, regular, or se-
vere as to alter the conditions of her work, nor did she allege that
Maggio's actions interfered with her ability to do her job."3 1
If, as the court determined, it was possible that the supervisor was
retaliating against her for complaining about him, this should also be
considered evidence of sexual harassment. If a supervisor is willing to
give an employee poor evaluations and recommend her termination
because of complaints of sexual harassment,31 1 this constitutes impor-
tant evidence of hostile environment that the court must consider in
evaluating whether the conduct is "severe or pervasive." The effect of
the judge's ruling is to effectively limit the jury to finding that the
plaintiff was fired for complaining about non-actionable sexual harass-
ment. If, however, she was not fired for complaining, but rather, her
discharge was justified because the harassing conduct caused her job
performance to suffer, she has no recourse.
In addition to ignoring evidence of retaliatory conduct for pur-
poses of whether the conduct is severe or pervasive, the courts often
ignore evidence of gender harassment that is not sexualized.3 12 For
example, in Robbins v. South Bend Public Transportation Corporation, the
court discussed the severe or pervasive standard at length.3 13 The
plaintiff, Robbins, complained that she had been sexually harassed by
her supervisor, Wise. 314 The court, although acknowledging that har-
assment does not have to be of a sexual nature to constitute sexual
harassment, recounted numerous problems that the plaintiff allegedly
experienced with Wise: "he had pressed his body against hers; he said
'ugly things' to her; and on two occasions, he pulled or tugged on her
309. No. Civ. A. 96-5780, 1997 WL 799437, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997).
310. Id. at *6.
311. See, e.g., Dudley v. Metro-Dade County, 989 F. Supp. 1192 (Fla. 1997). See supra
text accompanying notes 278-294 for a discussion of the case.
312. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks, and Competent Het-
erosexual White Men: The Sexual and Racial Morality Underlying Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, 7
YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 195, 208-10 (1995) (discussing how the courts ignore non-sexualized
gender discrimination complaints). The Supreme Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc. made it clear that harassment need not be based on sexual desire to be action-
able. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
313. No. 3:95-CV-54IRP, 1996 WL 698023, *4-6 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 3, 1996).
314. Id. at *2.
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hair."3" After Robbins complained, Wise engaged in additional con-
duct which Robbins claimed was sexually harassing and discrimina-
tory. Among other things, Wise refused to speak to her, and he
treated her differently from other operators.316 The court admitted
that the plaintiff had been subjected to "unpleasantness" by Mr. Wise.
However, because he did not direct obscene language or gestures at
her, show her pornographic pictures, expose himself, solicit sexual re-
lations with her, or sexually assault her, "there was insufficient evi-
dence to support a finding or reasonable inference that, from an
objective standpoint, her work environment was sufficiently hostile or
abusive." '317 The court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in
favor of the defendant.318 The foregoing cases illustrate situations in
which the courts have determined that the harassment was not action-
able by failing to recognize that conduct that is not sexualized can also
constitute harassment. Harassment based on the plaintiffs gender
and retaliatory harassment are two types of harassment that some
courts ignore in determining whether the conduct is sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive.
Some courts use another tactic to parse the evidence of harass-
ment: they reject evidence of harassment that occurred before the
employer took some remedial action even though it does not stop the
315. Id. at *4, *7.
316. Id. at *7. The other conduct she complained of consisted of the following:
[The supervisor also discriminated against her] by having the dispatcher give her
the paperwork, by once bringing another operator along to pick her up at the
garage; if she would call on the radio, he would "take his time coming;" if she
needed a bus change, he would tell her to "write it up;" he was arrogant; he
refused her request that he pick up her work; he once told other Transpo em-
ployees that she was a troublemaker; he yelled at her on one occasion; he once
told an off-color joke about Mexican women; on one occasion he failed to hold
the door open for her; and he drove a van very close to her in Transpo's lot. Ms.
Robbins felt that the other drivers were "picking sides" between her and Wise. In
addition, Mr. Wise sexually and verbally harassed another female employee and
had once fondled her breasts. On at least one occasion, Mr. Wise was rude to
other female operators.
Id.
317. Id. (emphasis added).
318. Id. Similarly, in Hyde v. Graebel/New Orleans Movers, Inc., the plaintiff complained
that a manager had made mildly inappropriate comments to her and had touched her
arms and hair several times in a way that made her feel uncomfortable. No. 98-3126, 1999
WL 335385, at *3-7 (E.D. La. May 25, 1999). The court was probably correct that this
behavior did not amount to sexual harassment. After the plaintiff complained about the
conduct, however, the plaintiff contended that the manager retaliated against her. Id. at
*2. She was required to take a position she did not want and was constructively discharged.
Id. The court separately analyzed this as retaliation rather than as part of the conduct that
caused the conduct to amount to sexual harassment. Id. at *3-6.
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harassment. 319 The following case illustrates this, along with the tactic
of not considering retaliation as part of the severe or pervasive
requirement.
In Hodoh-Drummond v. Summit County,3 20 the plaintiff complained
about sexual and racial harassment. The principle act of sexual har-
assment occurred when the plaintiffs co-worker, John Croghan, un-
zipped the plaintiffs blouse, "exposing her breasts. '32 1 Croghan's
supervisor, Kinzel, observed the incident, and both walked away
laughing at the plaintiff.3 22 The court said that, "assuming that the
incident with John Croghan was severe enough to create a hostile en-
vironment," the plaintiff did not show that the employer did not take
323corrective action.  The supervisor was put on unpaid leave for thirty
days, pending investigation.324 The court, however, denied the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of retaliation for
complaining about sexual harassment. 325  If it is possible that the
plaintiff was retaliated against for complaining about sexual harass-
ment, then the corrective action taken by the defendant was not effec-
tive. Furthermore, any retaliation should be considered part of the
sexual harassment and dismissing that part of the complaint was
inappropriate.
Similarly, in Caudillo v. Continental Bank/Bank of America Illinois,326
the district court decided that the employer had sufficiently remedied
the plaintiffs complaints of sexual harassment.3 27  Among other
things, the plaintiffs co-worker, Mabry, asked the plaintiff for a date,
which she declined; he stared at her in a "'sexual' manner," and
319. In order to establish an affirmative defense under Ellerth, the defendant must show
that it took reasonable care to prevent future acts of harassment. Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). There is nojustification to use the same standard to cut
off evidence of whether the conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive.
320. 84 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
321. Id. at 879.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 880.
324. Id. at 881.
325. Id. at 885. The court also denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment
based on retaliation for complaining about racial harassment. Id. at 884.
326. No. 97 C 884, 1998 WL 409406 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 1998) [hereinafter Caudillo 1],
aff'd, No. 98-3032, 1999 WL 542899 (7th Cir. July 26, 1996). Here, the court did apply the
continuing violation theory, but decided that the incidents that occurred after the statu-
tory period were insufficient to constitute actionable harassment. Id. at *4. The appellate
court expressed "grave reservations" with regard to the lower court's holding that the con-
duct before the remedial action was not sexual harassment, but agreed that the employer
had taken sufficient action to remedy the situation. Caudillo v. Continental Bank/Bank of
Am., No. 98-3032, 1999 WL 542899 at *4 (7th Cir. July 26, 1999) [hereinafter Caudillo Il].
327. Caudillo 1, 1998 IWL 409406, at *5.
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"touched her hair and shoulder," after which she told him not to
touch her. Three months later, he grabbed her arm and brushed her
breast.328 Later, he "placed his arm around her shoulder, and moved
his hand down her breast. '3 29 On another occasion, he "brushed the
front part of his body against the back of her body. ' 33 ' After the
plaintiff complained about these incidents and others involving com-
ments, not touching, the employer instructed Mabry to have no fur-
ther contact with the plaintiff.33 1 Thereafter, Mabry did not make any
further comments to the plaintiff or touch her. The plaintiff, how-
ever, alleged that Mabry continued to stare at her in an intimidating
manner.3 2 Neither the lower court3 3 3 nor the appellate court33 4
seemed bothered by this allegation and considered the employer to
have remedied the situation. The lower court said that staring alone
did not constitute sexual harassment,33 5 as if the staring had occurred
in a vacuum. What the Caudillo court, and others, fail to appreciate is
the fact that, once an employee has been sexually harassed, even the
slightest hint of resumption of bad conduct would make a reasonable
woman feel threatened. 3 6
328. Id. at *1.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at *2.
332. Id.
333. Id. *5.
334. Caudillo II, No. 90-3032, 1999 WL 542899, at *4 (7th Cir. July 26, 1999).
335. Caudillo I, 1998 WL 409406, at *5. The appellate court apparently agreed in saying
that the situation had been remedied: "These efforts, we conclude, were reasonably calcu-
lated under the circumstances to prevent further harassment." Caudillo II, 1999 WL
542899, at *4.
336. Stephen Aden takes issue with the idea that:
the harassing threat or promise is insufficient standing alone to accomplish con-
ditioning (of ajob benefit based on sex]. To the contrary, "conditioning" occurs
in this instance. For the employee who resists, the threat continues to hang over
her like a sword of Damocles, and may cause repeated and pervasive stress arising
out of her inability to predict his response to her resistance. A supervisor brutal
enough to impose an unconscionable sexual term of employment must reasona-
bly be perceived as brutal enough to exact the consequences for non-compliance.
Aden, supra note 47, at 498.
In Crenshaw v. Delray Farms, Inc., the plaintiff complained each time she was harassed,
and the company moved her into another area each time. However, she was harassed by
different people in each area of the plant in which she worked. 968 F. Supp. 1300, 1301-03
(N.D. Ill. 1997). The court held that the conduct was insufficiently severe or pervasive, but
even if it was persistent, the employer appropriately dealt with it. Id. at 1306. In Crenshaw,
the harassment did not stop, and it was carried on by a number of people. Id. at 1301-03.
A reasonable jury could interpret this to mean that the conduct was widespread and that
the employer had not taken effective steps to insure that the environment was free from
harassment. The court instead rewarded the employer for tolerating an environment in
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The cases cited in this section illustrate the point that courts
faced with cumulative evidence of severe or pervasive harassment
parse the evidence by various methods to avoid allowing the issue to
go to a jury. The courts frequently fail to consider evidence of gender
harassment and retaliation as part of the evidence of whether a rea-
sonable person would perceive the environment as abusive.33 7 The
courts also often fail to consider harassment that occurred before the
short statute of limitations period as a continuing violation or even as
background before the Supreme Court limited their ability to do so in
the Morgan case. 3 1' Finally, some courts ignore evidence that oc-
curred after the employer took remedial measures, even if the mea-
sures were insufficient to stop the harassment. The problem with all
of these tactics is that the plaintiff is caught in a "Catch 22." To be
considered severe or pervasive, the courts require the harassment to
continue for a considerable period. Therefore, if the plaintiff com-
plains too soon, the conduct is not sufficiently severe or pervasive, and
according to the Supreme Court in Clark County School District v.
Breeden," 9 the plaintiff may be retaliated against with impunity for
complaining. If she waits too long, the courts may not consider some
of the acts of harassment.34 ° Furthermore, she may be considered to
have failed to avoid the harm, thus losing her remedy under Ellerth.
III. ANALYSIS
Courts have dealt poorly with sexual harassment in part because
of conceptual problems that originated in the history of sexual harass-
ment guidelines and law.3 41 At the time the EEOC issued its guide-
lines, most courts did not recognize that sexual harassment was
discriminatory. Therefore, the EEOC guidelines were necessary to
create the cause of action. Ironically, perhaps because the definition
adopted by the EEOC was underinclusive-covering only harassment
based on sexual conduct-and overinclusive-describing two manifes-
which the plaintiff could be sexually harassed in every area of the company in which she
worked.
337. This is the standard for hostile environment articulated by the Harris case. See supra
Section I.C.2.
338. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2075, 2077 (2002).
339. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
340. While this is much less likely after the Morgan case for purposes of the continuing
violation theory, the Court said that if the plaintiff waits too long, laches, estoppel, or
waiver may apply. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. at 2072. Similarly, if a court decides that the conduct
is unrelated or if the employer intervened, the plaintiff may still lose her claim. Id. at 2075.
341. See supra Section I.E for a discussion of the early development of sexual harass-
ment law.
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tations of sexual harassment, hostile environment and quid pro quo-
the courts accepted the idea that sexual harassment was "different"
and could be treated differently from other types of discrimination.342
The EEOC defined sexual harassment as "[u] nwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature,... when submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment" and is used as the basis for an employment decision or
creates an offensive working environment. 43 This type of sexual har-
assment is based on sexual conduct. The other type of sexual harass-
ment does not involve sexual conduct, but rather would cover such
conduct as derogatory comments about a person's gender.344 There
can be no real dispute that Title VII was intended to cover the pure
gender-type sexual harassment;345 however, some courts tend to dis-
miss sex-based harassment that does not involve sexual advances.346
In addition, because the EEOC accepted the idea of two manifes-
tations of sexual harassment, quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment,347 hostile environment sexual harassment has been treated
differently, and, ultimately, unfavorably.3 48 Quid pro quo harassment
would generally not arise in other types of harassment, other than sex-
ual conduct harassment. Quid pro quo harassment involves requests
for sexual favors that, if declined, lead to retaliation in the form of a
tangible employment consequence, such as discharge or failure to
342. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (citing and discussing the EEOC's
definition of sexual harassment).
343. Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2001). The EEOC
adopted this view of sexual harassment from Catharine MacKinnon's influential book on
the subject tided Sexual Harassment of Working Women. Chamallas, supra note 40, at 39. See
Linda B. Epstein, Note, Wat is a Gender Norm and Why Should We Care? Implementing a New
Theory In Sexual Harassment Law, 51 STAN. L. REv. 161 (1998) for a discussion of the litera-
ture in this regard.
344. See Robbins v. S. Bend Pub. Transp. Corp., No. 3:95-CV-541RP, 1996 WL 698023, at
*4 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 3, 1996).
345. See Colker, supra note 312, at 195 n.3 (citing the language of Title VII and equating
the word "sex" with "gender").
346. This is exemplified by the cases cited above in which the courts did not consider
the employer's acts of retaliation as part of the evidence of sexual harassment, as well as
the cases in which gender-related harassment was ignored. See supra Section I.D. The
EEOC tried to rectify this problem with the proposed guidelines on all types of harassment
issued in 1993, but withdrew them for reasons set forth above. The Supreme Court in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., made it clear that harassing conduct need not be
based on sexual desire to be actionable. 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).
347. See Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2001).
348. See supra Section II.C (describing the difference in treatment between hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claims and racial harassment claims).
2003]
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promote.3 4 9 Properly analyzed, however, if the plaintiff suffers a tangi-
ble job consequence as a result of sexual harassment, it is analytically
indistinguishable from any other type of discrimination and need not
be analyzed as a harassment case. 5 °
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court apparently has chosen not
only to maintain two separate types of sexual harassment cases, 35 ' but
has further complicated the genre. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court de-
cided that the employer will be strictly liable only for significant tangi-
ble employment actions; less significant tangible employment action
and threats of such action will be treated the same as hostile environ-
ment harassment for which the employer has an affirmative
defense.352
In short, the courts have discriminated against hostile environ-
ment harassment. It has been singled out as the only term or condi-
tion of employment for which the employer has an affirmative defense
to liability, and it is the only term or condition of employment that is
required to be severe or pervasive to be actionable. While this dis-
criminatory treatment has affected other types of harassment,35 3 not
just sexual harassment, the problem has been most acute in the area
of sexual harassment.3 5 4  If the usual test for discrimination-
"whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms
or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are
not exposed" 355 -were applied to the conduct described in the lower
court cases discussed above, it would be clear that women employees
in those cases were being subjected to conditions of employment to
which men were not.
Because the Supreme Court has followed the lead of the EEOC
and the lower courts in treating hostile environment harassment as a
separate genre of discrimination, results have been anomalous. The
most glaring anomaly has been the level of opprobrious conduct toler-
ated by many lower courts, especially in sexual harassment cases. The
origin of this tolerance is language derived from an early harassment
349. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
350. See Scalia, supra note 47, at 309-24 for a discussion of the necessity vel non of a
separate category for quid pro quo sexual harassment.
351. See supra Section I.C (describing the Supreme Court's handling of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claims).
352. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
353. See supra Section II.C.
354. See supra Section II.B (describing the uniqueness of the dichotomy in sexual harass-
ment claims).
355. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
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case, Henson v. Dundee, that opined that, to be actionable, harassment
must be severe and persistent.856 This language was suggested by Rog-
ers v. EEOC, the earliest harassment case to recognize that the worker's
"psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to
protection from employer abuse. 35 7 The Rogers court said in dicta
that it was unwilling to condemn "an employer's mere utterance of an
ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings" but was
equally unwilling "to hold that a discriminatory atmosphere could
under no set of circumstances ever constitute an unlawful employ-
ment practice. One can readily envision working environments so
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emo-
tional and psychological stability of minority group workers." '3 5 8 This
quote illustrates exactly the inadequate guidance that courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, have continued to offer. There is an indispu-
tably wide gap between, on the one hand, the single utterance of an
epithet and, on the other, conduct that is so egregious that it causes
the employee psychological damage. Consequently, there is little or
no guidance to distinguish between very serious conduct that would
obviously constitute a hostile environment and inconsequential con-
duct that would obviously not constitute a hostile environment. How-
ever, what the courts, including the Supreme Court, utterly fail to do
is identify at what point between these two extreme opposites, the con-
duct becomes sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable.
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court finally clarified that the
harassment did not have to be so extreme as to damage the em-
ployee's psychological well-being.3 59 Unfortunately, while declaring
that the level of conduct did not have to be as extreme as the lower
courts were requiring, the Court continued to employ the "severe or
pervasive," terminology which connotes a high level of offensive con-
duct.36 ° The Court's retention of the phrase has encouraged the
lower courts to continue to require the same level of conduct, without
requiring actual proof of psychological damage.36 1
356. 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
357. 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
358. Id.
359. 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
360. Id at 21-23.
361. See supra Section II (discussing lower courts' decisions); see also Beiner, supra note
159, at 101-19 (discussing the misuse of summaryjudgments in employment discrimination
cases). Beiner reported the results from various judicial task forces on gender bias. Id. at
127. For example, in one circuit, close to 50 percent of judges did not disagree with the
statement that the issues in sex discrimination cases were not deserving of the court's time
because the issues were trivial. Id.
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One could argue that some courts seem particularly averse to hos-
tile environment sexual harassment cases and take every opportunity
to relieve the defendant of the burden of going to court. In most of
the cases discussed above, the court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment under very questionable circumstances. In
Harris, the Court said that the harassment had to be severe or perva-
sive enough to be reasonably perceived as hostile or abusive. 62 To
determine whether the conduct has been severe or pervasive, the
Court said, the following factors may be considered: frequency and
severity of the conduct, "whether it is physically threatening or humili-
ating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably in-
terferes with an employee's work performance.... [N] o single factor
is required."363 Many courts, however, require that at least one and
usually more than one, or that even all, of the factors be present. In
effect, these courts require that the conduct be severe and pervasive.
Under any standard, some of the conduct tolerated by the courts in
these cases would outrage any reasonable person. Much of the con-
duct would be criminal.3 6 4 Nevertheless, courts basically say that the
employer may legally condone such conduct because it is not severe
or pervasive enough to be actionable harassment. Therefore, the em-
ployee has no recourse if she complains that a co-worker or supervisor
frequently called her a "bitch"365 or patted her buttocks366 or pinned
her to the wall and forced her to kiss him367 or grabbed her breast 68
or engaged in any of the other conduct found not to be actionable as
a matter of law in the cases cited above. In addition, she is in very real
danger of being retaliated against for making the complaint. 369 In
fact, some courts require the plaintiff to promptly complain, not only
for purposes of employer liability, but to show that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to subjectively offend the plaintiff.370
362. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
363. Id. at 23.
364. See Hannigan-Haas v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., No. 95 C 7408, 1996 WL 650419, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 1996) (centering around an incident that would qualify under the
Model Penal Code's definition of "sexual assault").
365. See Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1165 (7th Cir.
1996), overruled in part by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002).
366. See Blough v. Hawkins Mkt., Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 858, 862 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
367. See Hannigan-Haas, 1996 WL 650419, at *1.
368. See Crenshaw v. Delray Farms, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1300, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
369. See the cases cited in Section II.C.2.
370. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 147, at 1266 (indicating that courts are holding that if
the employee does not complain within a month of commencement of the harassment, she
loses her defense against retaliation).
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Furthermore, when courts are faced with a course of conduct that
is undeniably legally sufficient, they have parsed the evidence to avoid
finding that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive. Prior to
the Morgan case,371 some courts strictly limited the evidence of sexual
harassment to the short 180 day statutory period under Title VII, de-
spite the requirement that to be pervasive discrimination the harass-
ment must occur over a significant period of time. 72 Still other
courts refuse to consider evidence of other types of gender harass-
ment (harassment not involving sexual advances) as part of the evi-
dence of severe or pervasive harassment.3 7 3  Still other courts
separately assess evidence of retaliation rather than include it as part
of the proof of hostile environment.374
The Supreme Court has recently exacerbated the problem of re-
taliation by its holding in Clark County School District v. Breeden.375 The
Breeden Court held that if the plaintiff complains about harassment
and is disciplined for complaining, she has no recourse if a court later
decides that she was unreasonably mistaken about whether the con-
duct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable. 376 The lower
courts that decided the cases described above will undoubtedly use
this case to find that the plaintiffs have unreasonably complained
about intolerable behavior and will bar the retaliation actions as well.
In most of the lower court cases cited above, the plaintiff was
harassed by her supervisor, which exacerbates the hostility of the envi-
ronment. These courts do not appear to recognize the difference be-
tween being harassed by a supervisor and being harassed by a
stranger. As Professor Susan Estrich explained, supervisors have a
substantial amount of power over their employees. Unlike a situation
in which a woman is harassed by another employee or a stranger, her
supervisor is not only there everyday, responsible for her work, but
also he has the power to hire, fire, and decide work schedules and pay
rates. His power to supervise "does not disappear, except perhaps in
the eye of the . . .court, when he chooses to harass through insults
371. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002). See supra Sections
I.E.5 and II.C.1. for a discussion of the case.
372. See supra Section II.C.1 (describing courts' application of the continuing violation
theory).
373. See supra Section II.C.2 (examining cases where courts have distinguished evidence
of retaliation from harassment).
374. Id.
375. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
376. Id. at 269-71.
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and offensive gestures rather than directly with threats of firing or
promises of promotion.
v3 77
The discrimination against hostile environment sexual harass-
ment cases is particularly evident when these cases are compared to
racial and ethnic harassment cases. The Harris and Faragher cases indi-
cated that the same severe or pervasive standard should apply to all
types of hostile environment harassment cases, 378 but in fact the stan-
dard is not applied in the same way. Courts seem to be rather callous
in their regard towards sexual harassment but much more sympa-
thetic toward racial and ethnic harassment.3 79 The standard should
be the same, and it should be applied in the more sympathetic man-
ner in sexual harassment cases as well. As Robert Gregory pointed out
in his article on this subject, that some courts are "unable to see the
parallel history of subjugation conjured up by the co-worker's sexually
abusive conduct."38 0 Gregory believes that judges are uncomfortable
patrolling the workplace for sexual harassment, as if it were more ac-
ceptable than racial harassment. 81 Title VII requires that judges
transform the workplace to eliminate societal prejudices, according to
Gregory, and judges must learn to be as empathetic to victims of sex-
ual harassment as they are to victims of racial harassment.38 2
Another author, Professor Camille Hebert, pointed out that
"[m] uch of the workplace behavior prohibited by Title VII, whether of
a sexual or racial nature, had been socially accepted before the enact-
ment of the statute."3 83 Thus, the refusal to equate sexual harassment
with racial harassment, because the former has been more socially ac-
ceptable, is inconsistent with Title VII and its antidiscrimination
purpose. 84
The psychological and physical reaction of women and racial mi-
norities to harassment may also be similar.3 8 5
What makes sexual harassment more offensive, more
debilitating, and more dehumanizing to its victims than
other forms of discrimination is precisely the fact that it is
377. Estrich, supra note 24, at 854. Ellerth characterized threats to take action as hostile
environment not quid pro quo. 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998).
378. Harris, 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.1 (1998).
379. See Gregory, supra note 25, at 767.
380. Id. at 768.
381. Id. at 773.
382. Id. at 776-77.
383. See H1bert, Analogizing Race, supra note 23, at 834.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 839-40; see supra note 25 (quoting Susan Estsrich discussing the magnitude of
injury sexual harassment imposes upon its victims).
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sexual. Not only are men exercising power over women, but
they are operating in a realm which is still judged according
to a gender double standard, itself a reflection of the extent
to which sexuality is used to penalize women. 86
Furthermore, women are more often victims of rape or sexual assault
than men, so that women are more sensitive to sexual misconduct.387
After a review of the cases described in this article in which verbal
sexual harassment has become physical and has even culminated in
sexual assault,38 8 it is obvious that "'this fear on the part of women is
not groundless or the result of hysteria."'
389
The only reason to distinguish between sexual and racial harass-
ment is that racial harassment could never be welcome, and sexual
harassment could be. Once the element of unwelcomeness is shown
for sexual harassment, there is no reason to treat the two genres
differently.
The question remains of what standard to apply. Justice Gins-
burg provided the answer in her concurrence in Harris.
The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether mem-
bers of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or con-
ditions of employment to which members of the other sex
are not exposed .... It suffices to prove that a reasonable
person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find,
as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working condi-
tions as to "ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job."3 0°
Many courts do not agree with this standard. For example, the Fifth
Circuit has said that "[a] hostile environment claim embodies a series
of criteria that express extremely insensitive conduct against women, con-
duct so egregious as to alter the conditions of employment and destroy
their equal opportunity in the workplace."3 '' The court thought that
only the most opprobrious conduct should be proscribed because "a
less onerous standard of liability would attempt to insulate women
386. Estrich, supra note 25, at 820.
387. H1bert, supra note 23, at 841-42.
388. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); supra cases cited
in Section II.B.
389. H~bert, supra note 23, at 841-42 (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th
Cir. 1991)).
390. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis
added) (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)).
391. DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F. 3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1995)
(emphasis added) (finding that a column in the police association newsletter critical of
women police officers was insufficiently severe or pervasive).
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from everyday insults as if they remained models of Victorian
reticence."39 2
Courts that agree with the Fifth Circuit require that severe or per-
vasive conduct must be "so egregious as to alter the conditions of em-
ployment and destroy [a woman's] equal opportunity in the
workplace." 93 Perhaps no other statement expresses so clearly how
wrong these courts are in their interpretation of Title VII.
CONCLUSION
Title VII forbids discrimination in "compensation, terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment. '394 No justification exists for dis-
criminating among the various terms and conditions of employment.
Because of the early treatment of sexual harassment, the term or con-
dition of employment of maintaining a non-hostile environment has
been treated differently from other terms or conditions of employ-
ment. The single biggest obstacle to treating hostile environment the
same as other terms or conditions of employment is the requirement
that the harassment be "severe or pervasive." The requirement over-
states what is required to prove the case. The Supreme Court has
made it clear that "severe or pervasive" means conduct that "a reason-
able person would find hostile or abusive."395 The Supreme Court
should admit that the "severe or pervasive" terminology has caused
much mischief, cease to use the phrase, and rely on the reasonable
person standard, taking into account that the reasonable person is a
usually a woman.
392. Id.
393. Id. (emphasis added).
394. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
395. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. The conduct also must subjectively offend the plaintiff and
be sufficient to offend a reasonable person but need not lead to physical or psychological
impairment. Id. at 21-22. In other words, the "environment would reasonably be per-
ceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive." Id. at 22.
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